Journal of Applied Psychology
2012, Vol. 97, No. 6, 1131–1147

0021-9010/12/$12.00 DOI: 10.1037/a0029993

Conflict Cultures in Organizations: How Leaders Shape Conflict Cultures and Their Organizational-Level Consequences

Michele J. Gelfand
University of Maryland

Lisa M. Leslie
University of Minnesota

Kirsten Keller
Rand Corporation

Carsten de Dreu
University of Amsterdam

Anecdotal evidence abounds that organizations have distinct conflict cultures, or socially shared norms for how conflict should be managed. However, research to date has largely focused on conflict management styles at the individual and small group level, and has yet to examine whether organizations create socially shared and normative ways to manage conflict. In a sample of leaders and members from 92 branches of a large bank, factor analysis and aggregation analyses show that 3 conflict cultures—collaborative, dominating, and avoidant—operate at the unit level of analysis. Building on Lewin, Lippitt, and White's (1939) classic work, we find that leaders' own conflict management behaviors are associated with distinct unit conflict cultures. The results also demonstrate that conflict cultures have implications for macro branch-level outcomes, including branch viability (i.e., cohesion, potency, and burnout) and branch performance (i.e., creativity and customer service). A conflict culture perspective moves beyond the individual level and provides new insight into the dynamics of conflict management in organizational contexts.

Keywords: culture, conflict management, norms, leadership, organizations

Why do some organizations develop cultures in which conflict is managed productively, whereas others have cultures in which members consistently work against one another, sabotaging each other in and out of the boardroom? Southwest Airlines, for example, has been argued to have a collaborative conflict culture (Gittell, 2003), whereas other organizations such as Playco describe themselves as having a dominating conflict culture, approaching conflict like they are in "the Old West" or through "warfare games" (Morill, 1995, p. 195). Still others, such as the now defunct Wang laboratories, are known to have avoidant cultures, in which people actively suppress conflict at all costs (Finkelstein, 2005). Conflict cultures emerge not only in traditional organizations but also in other contexts, such as the inner circles of the 2008 democratic presidential candidates. "No drama Obama" was known to have a "circle of people who were collaborative and nondefensive" (Tumulty, 2008, p. 1), whereas Hillary Clinton was headlined as having "a staff consumed with infighting over how to sell their candidate" (Sheehy, 2008, p. 2). For psychologists, many questions remain unasked and unanswered: Is there any evidence that conflict cultures exist at the organizational level? How do such distinct conflict cultures develop? How do leaders shape the development of conflict cultures? What are the consequences of conflict cultures for organizational-level outcomes?

Answers to these questions cannot be found in the psychological literature on conflict, which has generally focused on conflict management styles at the individual and small group level. In this research, we start with the premise that although individuals have idiosyncratic preferences for different conflict management strategies, organizations provide strong contexts (Johns, 2006; O'Reilly & Chatman, 1996) that serve to define socially shared and normative ways to manage conflict—what we refer to as *conflict cultures*—which reduce individual variation in conflict management strategies (De Dreu, van Dierendonck, & Dijkstra, 2004; Gelfand, Leslie, & Keller, 2008). Because norms typically develop around fundamental problems that need to be managed in any social system (Schein, 1992; Schwartz, 1994), and conflict is an inherent problem in most if not all organizational systems (Argyris, 1971; Katz & Kahn, 1978; Thomas, 1976; Walton, Dutton, & Cafferty, 1969), we expect that conflict cultures can develop in many organizations.

Here we develop a conflict cultures paradigm and provide a first-time test across 92 bank branches. We propose that conflict cultures, like their individual level and small-group analogues (e.g., De Church & Marks, 2001; De Dreu, 2006; De Dreu & Weingart, 2003a; Jehn, 1995; Jehn & Mannix, 2001; Lovelace,

This article was published Online First October 1, 2012.

Michele J. Gelfand, Department of Psychology, University of Maryland; Lisa M. Leslie, Carlson School of Management, University of Minnesota; Kirsten Keller, Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, CA; Carsten de Dreu, Department of Psychology, University of Amsterdam, the Netherlands.

This research was based on work supported in part by U.S. Airforce Grant FA9550-12-1-0021 and the U.S. Army Research Laboratory and the U.S. Army Research Office under Grant W911NF-08-1-0144.

Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Michele J. Gelfand, Department of Psychology, University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742. E-mail: mgelfand@umd.edu

Shapiro, & Weingart, 2001; Pruitt & Rubin, 1986; Simons & Peterson, 2000; Tjosvold, 1998; Ury, Brett, & Goldberg, 1988; Van de Vliert, 1997), take the form of avoidant, dominating, and collaborating, are at least partially shared by their members, and are distinct from other unit-level constructs such as justice climate, psychological safety, and learning and performance climate. Drawing on classic work by Lewin, Lippitt, and White (1939) and later by Schein (1983), we also test the notion that leaders' own conflict management styles are related to distinct conflict cultures and that conflict cultures predict unit-level outcomes, including viability, customer service, and creativity.

A transition to a more macro perspective on workplace conflict management not only enriches conflict theory but also situates the conflict literature more centrally in the mainstream organizational sciences literature. Largely separated from its organizational roots, conflict research has been isolated from other central topics in organizational behavior, such as leadership, organizational structure, culture, and organizational change. Reviews of the negotiation literature have rarely discussed whether and how conflict relates to organizational processes and performance, and likewise, reviews of organizational behavior rarely discuss conflict management (De Dreu & Gelfand, 2008). This research thus seeks to bring these disparate research traditions together, and is of the first to examine the consequences of conflict management for important unit outcomes. From an applied perspective, the conflict culture paradigm can pave the way for the development of new diagnostic tools and mechanisms for implementing systematic, organizational level change around conflict management. More generally, a macro conflict culture perspective complements extant micro perspectives, which together can provide a more comprehensive account of conflict management processes in situ, in this case, in organizational contexts.

The Cultural Basis of Conflict Management

Within the organizational sciences, the subject of conflict has been a constant preoccupation of organizational theories (Jaffee, 2008). Every school of organizational thought—from Weber's bureaucracy and scientific management, to human relations and cooperative systems, to open systems theory, among others—acknowledges the inherent complexities of human organization and conflicts that arise therein (Jaffee, 2008). In their classic work on the social psychology of organizations, Katz and Kahn (1978) observed that ". . . every aspect of organizational life that creates order and coordination of effort must overcome other tendencies to action, and in that fact lies the potentiality for conflict" (p. 617). Put simply, conflict in organizations is inevitable given that humans therein need to manage their mutual interdependence.

In light of these realities, it is perhaps not surprising that much research has focused on how to best *manage* conflict in organizations. Several decades of research has uncovered that individuals have distinct ways of managing their conflicts. Although a wide variety of conflict management strategies may be conceived of, the conflict literature converges on a broad distinction between three conflict management styles: *cooperation*, *competition*, and *avoidance* (e.g., Blake & Mouton, 1964; Chen, Liu, & Tjosvold, 2005; De Church & Marks, 2001; De Dreu & van Vianen, 2001; Deutsch, 1949; Lovelace et al., 2001; Pruitt & Rubin, 1986; Rahim & Magner, 1995; Weingart & Olekalns, 2004). *Cooperators* prefer a proactive approach and easily engage in constructive negotiations and collaborative problem solving. *Competitors* are inclined to compete and dominate the conflict partner—rather than negotiating open mindedly—and seek victory and perceive both the board room and shop floor as battlegrounds in which you eat or are eaten. Finally, *avoiders* tend to shy away from addressing conflict and go to great lengths to suppress the expression of conflict.

Research to date has advanced validated measurements of the three conflict management strategies at the individual and small-group level (e.g., De Dreu, Evers, Beersma, Kluwer, & Nauta, 2001; Rahim, 1983), identified a wide variety of individual-difference and situational predictors of these strategies, and uncovered the effects that these strategies have on individual and team outcomes (see, e.g., De Dreu & Gelfand, 2008, for a review). Nevertheless, the literature on workplace conflict management styles has been largely divorced from the workplace context itself and the ways in which features of organizations constrain or enable how conflict is managed at the unit level. Although individuals may have idiosyncratic preferences for different conflict management strategies, organizational contexts often provide strong situations (Johns, 2006; O'Reilly & Chatman, 1996) that serve to define what is a socially shared and normative way to manage conflict. That is, work settings are often highly stable and predictable: Employees generally interact with leaders who model behaviors they deem appropriate, employees have contact with similar coworkers and face similar (interpersonal) problems on a recurring basis, and incentive structures do not change overnight. In addition, individuals within the same unit, team, or department tend to influence one another (Salancik & Pfeffer, 1978), thus creating their own social environment with rather stable, and at least partially shared, views about the tasks to be done and ways of dealing with one another—including on how to manage conflicts.

An implication of these notions is that although individuals have their own personal preferences for different conflict management strategies, employees in a given unit may come to share similar attitudes about the normative ways to manage conflict—what we refer to as *conflict cultures*. By definition, conflict cultures guide organizational members' attitudes and behaviors, and thereby reduce the range of individual variation in strategies used to manage conflict in organizations. More formally, our theory suggests that conflict cultures may emerge through composition processes; that is, individual conflict management preferences converge around at least partially shared, normative means for handling conflict due to the repeated interactions and stable structures within organizational contexts, creating more variance between than within units on conflict management strategies and sufficient agreement on conflict cultures within units (cf. Kozlowski & Klein, 2000).

Over the past two decades, conflict scholars have indeed acknowledged the possibility that informal norms, routines, and practices regarding conflict management develop in organizations (Constantino & Merchant, 1996; Kolb & Putnam, 1992; Slaikeu & Hasson, 1998; Ury et al., 1988). Still others have shown that the tripartite conflict management styles of collaboration, domination, and avoidance exist at the small-group level of analysis (e.g., Chen et al., 2005; De Church & Marks, 2001; De Dreu & van Vianen, 2001; Lovelace et al., 2001). This notwithstanding, we are unaware of systematic research into the existence of conflict cultures, and their possible antecedents and consequences. Here we surmise that if individuals, and the groups within which they operate,

develop distinct preferences for collaborating, dominating, or avoiding, then it follows that at higher levels of analysis, a tripartite distinction might emerge as well (Gelfand et al., 2008). Thus, building on this classic and well-validated distinction between domination, collaborative, and avoidance as distinct modes of conflict management, we test the notion that at the organizational level, conflict cultures can also emerge through compositional processes to take the form of (a) dominating conflict cultures, wherein organizational members collectively seek competition and victory, and try to outwit others; (b) collaborative conflict cultures, wherein there is collective constructive dialogue, negotiation, and joint problem solving; and (c) avoidant conflict cultures, wherein organizational members collectively suppress and withdraw from conflict.[1] Each of these cultures is described in more detail below.

Dominating conflict cultures are characterized by conflict management norms that encourage active confrontation in order to publicly win conflicts (Gelfand et al., 2008). Underlying this conflict culture is the assumption that individuals have the agency to openly deal with conflict and that disagreeable or competitive behaviors are appropriate and normative. Normative behaviors for handling conflicts may include direct confrontations and heated arguments in which individuals are reluctant to give in, yelling and shouting matches, or threats and warnings. The Digital Equipment Corporation (DEC, Digital) provides a vivid example of a dominating conflict culture (Gelfand et al., 2008). At DEC, there was intense internal competition when organizational members disagreed with one another. The company emphasized "truth through conflict" and believed that if conflict situations were handled through open and heated debate, the best idea would ultimately win (DeLisi, 1998; Schein, 2003). Likewise, link.com (a pseudonym for a computer company) was described as being "a masculine culture, characterized by self-promotion, overt struggles for competition, and interpersonal norms that condoned yelling and other forms of controlled aggression" (Martin & Meyerson, 1998, p. 339). Similarly, at Playco, a company that manufactured children's toys and games, employees used words such as *sports* and *warfare games* to describe conflict management at the company (Morill, 1995, p. 195).

Collaborative conflict cultures, by contrast, are characterized by conflict management norms for active, cooperative discussion of conflict (Gelfand et al., 2008). Underlying this conflict culture is the assumption that individuals have agency to openly deal with conflict and that cooperative behaviors and resolving conflicts openly is normative and appropriate. In collaborative conflict cultures, normative behaviors for handling conflict may include active listening to the opinions of all parties involved, mediation of different perspectives, open and honest discussion of the conflict, and demonstrations of mutual respect. Southwest Airlines typifies a company that has historically had a collaborative conflict culture (Gittell, 2003). At Southwest, conflict is dealt with actively, but with a focus on resolutions that try to benefit all involved. According to one station manager, "What's unique about Southwest is that we're real proactive about conflict. We work very hard at destroying any turf battle once one crops up—and they do . . ." (Gittel, 2003, p. 101). Others observed that Southwest views conflict as a potentially constructive force, which is reinforced through organizational routines, such as information-gathering sessions, which help employees resolve their conflicts openly and constructively. Likewise, the early days of Hewlett-Packard provide an example of a collaborative conflict culture. The "HP Way" included an open-door policy in which "employees, should they have problems of either a personal or job-related nature, to discuss these with an appropriate manager," and thus encouraged a culture of trust and openness that facilitated collaborative conflict management (Packard, 1995, p. 157).

Finally, *avoidant conflict cultures* are characterized by norms for conflict management that are both agreeable and passive (Gelfand et al., 2008). Underlying this conflict culture is the assumption that conflict is dangerous and should be suppressed for the prosocial goal of maintaining harmonious relationships. Normative behaviors for handling conflict include accommodating or acquiescing to the point of view of others, changing the subject, and smoothing over or otherwise evading open discussion of the issue. Versity.com exemplifies a conflict-avoidant culture. As noted by Perlow (2003), at Versity, an online education company, conflict avoidance norms started from the top: "The managers and the founders willingly engaged in efforts to avoid conflict, perpetuating a norm of silence that had been set in motion in Peter's [CEO] first days in the company and continued to gain support" (p. 133). Commenting on how individuals masked their underlying disagreements to preserve harmony, Perlow (2003) remarked,

> I therefore had the privilege of listening to people speak to each other, and of knowing what they were not saying. I noticed early on that colleagues weren't being completely frank with one another . . . they smiled when they were seething; they nodded when deep down they couldn't have disagreed more. They pretended to accept differences for the sake of preserving their relationships and their business. And, the more people silenced themselves, the more pressure they felt to silence themselves again next time. (p. 9)

Research Goals and Hypotheses

As mentioned at the outset, research has yet to systematically and quantitatively identify the three distinct conflict cultures described above.[2] Accordingly, we had three goals for this research, including to (a) provide construct validity evidence for the three conflict cultures through factor analysis, aggregation statistics, and covergent and divergent relations with other related constructs; (b) examine leader affordances of conflict cultures; and (c) document the consequences of conflict cultures for unit-level outcomes.

Validity of the Conflict Cultures Constructs

Our first goal was to go beyond anecdotal accounts discussed above and empirically assess whether these conflict cultures exist at the organizational level of analysis. In order to provide evidence for a conflict culture perspective, we adapted existing and widely validated scales and examined whether the factor structure of these styles exists at the unit level. As with research at the individual and small-groups level (e.g., De Dreu et al., 2001; Lovelace et al.,

[1] Conflict scholars sometimes identify yielding and obliging as a distinct conflict management strategy (e.g., Pruitt & Rubin, 1986; Van de Vliert, 1997). Here we note that both are the mirror of dominating and at the aggregate level subsumed under dominating conflict cultures.

[2] These need not be the only types of conflict cultures that can emerge. Passive aggressive cultures, for example, that have norms that are competitive and passive, are also theorized to exist (see Gelfand et al., 2008), yet they were not measured in this study.

2001; Van de Vliert & Kabanof, 1990), we expected that collaborative, dominating, and avoidant conflict cultures are separate continua that will emerge as distinct factors, but are also related. Specifically, given that collaboration is a more productive conflict management strategy as compared with dominating and avoidance, we expected collaborative cultures to be negatively related to both avoidant and dominating conflict cultures, and dominating and avoidant cultures to be distinct yet positively related. We also examine whether members generally agree (share) conceptions of the conflict culture within their units. It is important to note that although we discuss distinct conflict cultures as a shared construct, conflict cultures are likely not perfectly shared as with other aggregate constructs.[3]

In gathering validity evidence for a conflict culture perspective, we also assess conflict cultures' convergent and divergent validity. We expect conflict cultures will be related to (i.e., correlated with) but distinct (i.e., factor separately) from climates for *psychological safety*, defined as the "shared belief that the team is safe for interpersonal risk taking" and "a sense of confidence that the team will not embarrass, reject, or punish someone for speaking up" (Edmondson, 1999, p. 354). Specifically, psychological safety should be positively correlated with collaborative conflict cultures, wherein individuals cooperatively consider each other's interests, but negatively related to dominating conflict cultures, wherein individuals are constantly attacking each other's views, and avoidant cultures, wherein individuals feel it is uncomfortable to have open conflict with others. Likewise, conflict cultures are likely related to but distinct from *justice climates*, defined as "shared perceptions of work unit treatment by authorities" (Roberson & Colquitt, 2005, p. 595; see also Mayer, Nishii, Schneider, & Goldstein, 2007). Collaborative conflict cultures are likely to be positively related to distributive, procedural, and interpersonal justice climates given that conflicts that are negotiated open-mindedly and result in agreements that tend to be inclusive of multiple parties' needs and concerns. By contrast, dominating conflict cultures are expected to be negatively related to justice climates, because conflicts are settled in win–lose fashion or impasse, and the conflict process tends to be marked by overt confrontation, power plays, and tendencies toward exclusion. Avoidant cultures should also be negatively related to justice climates given these cultures are characterized by less visible but no less impactful covert and suppressed negative emotion. Finally, we expect that conflict cultures are distinct from but related to *learning climates*, which emphasize proactive learning and competence development, and *performance climates*, which emphasize demonstrations of one's abilities (Bunderson & Sutcliff, 2003; Dragoni, 2005). Collaborative conflict cultures that emphasize problem solving should be positively related to learning climates that stress the importance of learning from mistakes and encourage experimentation (Dragoni, 2005). By contrast, performance-oriented climates are highly evaluative and reward employees when they perform better than others, and should be positively related to dominating conflict cultures.

Leader Affordances of Conflict Cultures

In addition to assessing the validity of a conflict culture perspective, we aimed at identifying critical drivers of conflict cultures. Drawing on the organizational culture literature, we consider how leaders' own conflict behavior affords particular conflict cultures within organizational units. Schein (1983) was among the first to argue that the personality of the leader affects the development of organizational culture. Particularly relevant to the present focus on leaders and conflict cultures is pioneering work by Lewin et al. (1939). In their now classic series of studies, these authors manipulated the leadership style used in different boys' clubs and found that boys in clubs with democratic leaders were friendlier, more spontaneous, and more cooperative as compared with boys in clubs with laissez-faire or autocratic leaders who were more competitive.

Although never directly measured, Lewin and colleagues (1939) attributed these differences in conflict behavior to the pattern of interactions or "social climate" created by the different leadership styles. Here we take this idea one step further and theorize that leaders' *own conflict management behaviors* are a driver of conflict cultures in organizations. In particular, through their own behaviors, leaders model what is an appropriate and a normative way to manage conflict in the unit. Scholars have long argued that leaders are among the more visible players in an organization, and thus their behavior has disproportional influence on team processes and organizational practices (e.g., Hogg, 2010). For example, research has shown that leaders' safety behavior is a prime determinant of safety culture (Barling, Loughlin, & Kelloway, 2002; Zohar, 2002), and leaders' service behavior drives unit service climate (Schneider, Ehrhart, Mayer, Saltz, & Niles-Jolly, 2005). From these findings, it follows that leaders who personally engage in cooperative conflict management styles signal that conflict should be solved constructively, that leaders who address conflict in a competitive and an inflexible manner signal that conflict should be approached in a dominating way, and that leaders who avoid conflict by suppressing open discussions signal to employees that dissenting opinions are not valued, and that conflict should be avoided. Leaders' own conflict behaviors are therefore likely to facilitate congruent conflict cultures. Accordingly, we predicted:

> *Hypothesis 1:* Leaders' own conflict management behaviors of avoidance, cooperation, and dominating will be positively related to avoidant, collaborative, and dominating unit-level conflict cultures, respectively.

Relationship of Conflict Cultures to Unit-Level Outcomes

Our final research goal was to document the relationship between conflict cultures, on the one hand, and unit-level outcomes, on the other. We focused on both unit viability, measured as cohesion, potency, and (a lack of) feelings of burnout, and unit performance—specifically, customer service and creativity. Collaboration and problem solving have all been positively associated with interpersonal and unit-level viability (Tjosvold, 1998), whereas overt fighting, competition, and active confrontation have been associated with reduced viability at the interpersonal and small-group level (De Dreu & Gelfand, 2008). Accordingly, we

[3] We also acknowledge that cultures can be differentiated within an organization such that they are shared within subunits, but differ across subunits (e.g., Martin, 1992; Tice & Morand, 1991).

expect dominating conflict cultures will negatively associate with unit viability, and collaborating conflict cultures will positively associate with unit viability. We had no a priori predictions about the relationship between avoidant conflict cultures and unit viability because avoidance may boost harmony-seeking tendencies (e.g., promoting cohesion; Leung & Brew, 2009) and simultaneously undermine well-being and feelings of self-worth (e.g., promoting burnout; De Dreu et al., 2004).

Hypothesis 2: Collaborative conflict cultures will be positively related to viability (i.e., be characterized by high cohesion, high potency, and low burnout), whereas dominating conflict cultures will be negatively related to viability (i.e., be characterized by low cohesion, low potency, and high burnout).

We also examined the relationship of conflict cultures with two different aspects of unit performance: creativity and customer service. Avoidant conflict cultures prevent the discussion needed to generate creative ideas and solutions, and thus avoidant conflict cultures should be associated with low unit-level creativity. The creativity and innovation literatures provide inconsistent evidence that suggests that dominating and collaborative conflict styles both hinder and help creativity (e.g., Beersma & De Dreu, 2005; De Dreu & West, 2001; Goncalo & Staw, 2006; Taggar, 2002). Thus, we had no a priori predictions about the relationship between dominating or collaborative conflict cultures and unit-level creativity.

Hypothesis 3: Avoidant conflict cultures will be negatively related to unit-level creativity.

Finally, with regard to customer service, the open conflict and lack of teamwork that characterize dominating conflict cultures are likely to impede "service with a smile" and prevent high-quality customer service. Reversely, in collaborative conflict cultures, conflicts and potential solutions are discussed openly in a supportive environment, leading to the coordination and cooperation needed to provide high-quality customer service, such that collaborative conflict cultures should be positively associated with high customer service. Alternatively, we had no a priori predictions regarding conflict-avoidant cultures and customer service.

Hypothesis 4: Collaborative conflict cultures will be positively related to unit-level customer service quality, whereas dominating conflict cultures will be negatively related to unit-level customer service quality.

Overview of the Present Research

We surveyed a sample of bank branches, which were geographically dispersed throughout the District of Columbia, Maryland, Virginia, and West Virginia. We defined *organizational units* as all branch members (i.e., employees) and the branch leader (i.e., manager) who worked together in the same physical location. Branch members and the branch leader had extensive opportunities to interact with one another. Moreover, the organization lists the ability to work together as part of a team as a core job requirement for branch employees. Thus, the bank branch setting was an appropriate context for testing the existence and correlates of organizational conflict cultures.

We collected data from three independent sources, including (a) member surveys, (b) leader ratings, and (c) archival data from the bank's records. The branch member survey included measures of conflict cultures, leader conflict behaviors, and unit viability (i.e., cohesion, potency, and burnout). The branch leader survey included a measure of branch creativity. Finally, we gathered independent ratings of branch-level customer service from the bank's archival records. By gathering data from multiple independent sources, we decreased the likelihood that common method variance provides an alternative explanation for our findings.

In addition to gathering data from different sources, we also followed recommendations for preventing common method bias for measures gathered from the same source (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, & Podsakoff, 2003). Specifically, we used different response scales for the survey measures, interspersed other survey measures between the measures of interest, and reduced participant apprehension by emphasizing that the employee survey was anonymous and encouraging truthful responses. We also conducted several analyses that suggest that it is unlikely that common method variance provides an alternative explanation for our findings (discussed in the Results section).

Method

Sample and Procedure

We gathered data from 862 branch members (i.e., employees) from 159 branches of a large bank in the mid-Atlantic United States (response rate: 59% overall, 62% within branches). We eliminated surveys that had large portions of missing data and limited the sample to those branches for which at least three members responded to the survey, resulting in 743 individuals across 131 branches (employees per branch: $M = 5.67$, $SD = 2.43$). The member sample was 51% Caucasian and 79% female. The majority of branch members worked full time (75%), and 77% of the members had worked in their branch for at least 6 months (branch tenure: $M = 3.37$ years, $SD = 5.09$). We used the full member sample for analyses that required member data only (factor analysis, aggregation, and validity evidence for the three conflict culture types).

We also sent a leader survey to each of the managers of the same 159 branches. Of the 159 managers in the sample, 108 completed the survey (response rate: 68%). We eliminated leader surveys that had large portions of missing data and limited the sample to those branches for which the branch leader had a tenure of at least 2 months (leader tenure: $M = 2.67$ years, $SD = 4.49$), and we also had matched member surveys. Controlling for leader tenure did not change the results. The matched member–leader sample included 92 branches (employees per branch: $M = 5.87$, $SD = 2.46$). The leaders were 65% Caucasian and 66% female. We used the matched member–leader sample for analyses that required leader and member data (i.e., antecedents and consequences of conflict cultures).

We mailed the member and leader surveys to the bank branches. The surveys were accompanied by two letters, one from a regional manager of the bank and one from the principal investigator. Respondents completed the surveys during work hours and used pre-paid envelopes to return the surveys to the principal investigator. Before mailing, we marked each survey with a branch code

to link members and leaders to the appropriate branches. All participants were entered in a lottery with a chance of winning $60. As described below, we supplemented the members' and leaders' surveys with data collected from the bank's archival records.

Measures

Conflict cultures. To assess conflict cultures, we used an adapted version of the Dutch Test for Conflict Handling (DUTCH; De Dreu et al., 2001; Janssen & van de Vliert, 1996). Closely related to similar instruments (e.g., The Rahim Organizational Conflict Inventory-II; Rahim & Magner, 1995), and originally developed to assess individual preferences for conflict management (De Dreu et al., 2001; Van de Vliert & Kabanoff, 1990), it has been used effectively to assess conflict management practices and preferences at the individual and small-group level (De Dreu, 2007; De Dreu & van Vianen, 2001). The measure targets four distinct types of conflict management—avoiding, collaborating, dominating, and yielding. At the unit level, dominating and yielding emerge as two sides of the same coin (De Dreu & van Vianen, 2001; De Dreu & Weingart, 2003b), and here we adapted five items to measure dominating practices ($\alpha = .79$). Together with the four items measuring collaborating ($\alpha = .87$) and the four items measuring avoiding ($\alpha = .66$), the member surveys contained 13 conflict cultures items. For each item, respondents were asked to rate the extent to which they agreed with statements regarding how branch members tend to respond when conflicts arise within their branch on a scale that ranged from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 5 (*strongly agree*). Example items include, "Branch members work out a solution that serves everyone's interests" for collaborative, "Branch members fight for what they want personally" for dominating, and "Branch members avoid openly discussing conflicts" for avoidant (see Appendix A for a full list of items).[4]

Leader conflict management behaviors. We similarly adapted the DUTCH (De Dreu et al., 2001) to create a new measure of manager conflict management behaviors. Like the Conflict Cultures scale, this scale included the three dimensions of collaborative ($\alpha = .74$), dominating ($\alpha = .61$), and avoidant ($\alpha = .70$) conflict management behaviors, and a response scale that ranged from 1 (*Strongly disagree*) to 5 (*Strongly agree*). Example items included, "My branch manager stresses that it is important to find a way for everyone to win when conflicts arise" for collaborative, "My branch manager allows branch members to argue until someone wins" for dominating, and "My branch manager will not discuss issues that may lead to conflict" for avoidant (see Appendix B for a full list of items).

Branch-level outcomes. We gathered data on unit viability (cohesion, potency, and burnout) and unit performance (customer service quality and creativity). The branch-level outcomes were gathered from three distinct sources. *Branch creativity* was assessed separately by branch leaders, using items adapted from De Dreu and West (2001). The measure contained five items and was rated on a response scale that ranged from 1 (*not at all*) to 5 (*very much*) ($\alpha = .92$). Example items include "This is an innovative branch" and "This branch produces new insights and ways of doing their tasks." *Customer service quality* was assessed with mystery shop scores gathered from the bank's archival records. The bank hired an independent consulting company to generate the mystery shop scores. Members of this organization made anonymous visits to the bank branches in which they posed as branch customers and rated the quality of customer service they received on a scale that ranged from 0% to 100%, where higher scores reflected higher quality customer service. The customer service quality ratings were available for 54 of the 92 branches in the sample (60%). The customer service index was collected for the quarter immediately following the quarter during which the leader and member surveys were administered.

We assessed unit viability in the employee surveys. The *Cohesion* scale included eight items and was rated on a response scale that ranged from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 7 (*strongly agree*) (adapted from Dobbins & Zaccaro, 1986; $\alpha = .88$). Example cohesion items include: "Branch members feel they are really part of a team" and "Branch members enjoy being members because they have many friends in the branch." The *Potency* measure included four items, examples of which include "My branch has confidence in itself" and "My branch believes it can be very productive" (adapted from Kirkman, Rosen, Tesluk, & Gibson, 2004). The items were rated on a response scale that ranged from 1 (*to no extent*) to 5 (*to a great extent*) ($\alpha = .87$). Finally, the *Burnout* measure included six items and was rated on a response scale that ranged from 1 (*never*) to 5 (*constantly*) (Maslach & Jackson, 1981; $\alpha = .91$). Example burnout items include, "I feel emotionally drained from my work" and "I feel used up at the end of the workday."

We used confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) to provide evidence that the three indicators of viability—cohesion, potency, and burnout—are distinct constructs. A three-factor CFA model, in which the items for the three constructs indicated three separate latent constructs, fit the data well, $\chi^2(132) = 518.40$, $p < .01$, comparative fit index (CFI) = .95, root-mean-square error of approximation (RMSEA) = .06. Moreover, the three-factor model fit the data significantly better than a one-factor model, in which all variables indicated the same latent construct, $\chi^2(135) = 3{,}616.09$, $p < .01$, CFI = .55, RMSEA = .19; $\Delta\chi^2(3) = 3{,}099.69$, $p < .01$.

Validity data. We included several climate measures that we used to validate the conflict culture types. First, we included a three-item measure of *psychological safety* (Edmondson, 1999). An example item was "If you make a mistake in this branch, it is often held against you" (reverse scored), and participants were asked to indicate how accurate each statement was in their branch from 1 (*very inaccurate*) to 7 (*very accurate*) ($\alpha = .59$). Second, we included a three-item measure of *learning climate* and a three-item measure of *performance climate* (Dragoni, 2005). An example learning climate item was, "In this branch, continuous learning is supported and rewarded," and an example performance climate item was, "How branch members' performance compares with their coworkers is often discussed." The response scale ranged from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 5 (*strongly agree*) (learning: $\alpha = .80$;

[4] Consistent with the cross-cultural psychology literature that differentiates values and practices (House, Hanges, Javidan, Dorfman, & Gupta, 2004), and as with other research on organizational culture (e.g., Van Dyck, Frese, Baer, & Sonnentag, 2005), we believe that individuals are better able to assess the more visible aspects of their organization's culture than its underlying and hidden assumptions. Accordingly, our measure focuses on shared perceptions of conflict management practices.

performance: $\alpha = .68$). Finally, we included Colquitt's (2001) three-item measure of *distributive justice climate* (e.g., "Do your rewards reflect the effort you have put into your work?"; $\alpha = .91$), six-item measure of *procedural justice climate* (e.g., "Have those procedures [used to arrive at your rewards] been applied consistently?"; $\alpha = .86$), and three-item measure of *interpersonal justice climate* (e.g., "Has he or she [the authority figure who enacts the procedures used to arrive at your rewards] treated you with dignity?"; $\alpha = .95$). All justice climate items were rated on a scale that ranged from 1 (*to no extent*) to 5 (*to a great extent*).

Control variables. We gathered a number of control variables from the three data sources described above. The member survey included measures of task (two items; $\alpha = .76$) and relationship conflict (three items; $\alpha = .82$), which were both rated on a response scale that ranged from 1 (*none*) to 5 (*a lot*) (Jehn & Mannix, 2001). We also controlled for leader gender, which was assessed in the manager survey (Male = 1, Female = 2). Finally, we controlled for *branch size* (i.e., number of members per branch).

Results

Exploratory Factor Analyses and Aggregation

Unit conflict cultures. We first examined whether different conflict cultures can be empirically established. We examined this through a two-step procedure. First, we conducted an exploratory factor analysis (EFA) with maximum likelihood estimation and varimax rotation to assess the factor structure of the conflict cultures measure. This individual level analysis clearly supported a three-factor solution of collaborative, dominating, and avoidant conflict cultures ($\lambda_1 = 4.71$, $\lambda_2 = 1.86$, $\lambda_3 = 1.28$, $\lambda_{4-13} < 1.00$; 49% variance explained), in which all items had loadings higher than .40 on the intended factor and loadings lower than .40 on the remaining factors (see Appendix A for factor loadings). Thus, the factor analysis supported the existence of the three distinct conflict culture types. Moreover, bivariate correlations corroborate our expectation that collaborative conflict cultures are negatively related to dominating ($r = -.74$, $p < .01$) and avoidant cultures ($r = -.35$, $p < .01$), whereas these latter two are positively related ($r = .26$, $p < .01$).

In keeping with our conceptualization of conflict cultures as a construct that is at least partially shared, we calculated several aggregation statistics to provide evidence that the conflict cultures measure operated at the branch level of analysis, including $r_{wg(j)}$, ICC(1), and ICC(2). As shown in Table 1, the average $r_{wg(j)}$ value across branches was well above the recommended value of .70 (collaborative: mean $r_{wg[j]} = .80$, median $r_{wg[j]} = .88$; dominating: mean $r_{wg[j]} = .81$, median $r_{wg[j]} = .88$; avoidant: mean $r_{wg[j]} = .75$, median $r_{wg[j]} = .82$). Moreover, all of the ICC(1) values were statistically significant (collaborative: ICC[1] = .14, $p < .01$; dominating: ICC[1] = .15, $p < .01$; avoidant: ICC[1] = .04, $p < .05$). The ICC(2) values were below the .70 recommended value (collaborative: ICC[2] = .48; dominating: ICC[2] = .51; avoidant: ICC[2] = .20). However, low ICC(2) values are not particularly surprising, given that the size of the branches was comparatively small and ICC(2) values are constrained by group size (Bliese, 2000). With the exception of avoidant conflict cultures, the ICC(2) values were nevertheless within the range of values reported in prior research and not so small to make aggregation inappropriate (Schneider, Salvaggio, & Subirats, 2002; Schneider, White, &

Table 1
Aggregation Statistics

Variable	$r_{wg(j)}$ *M*	$r_{wg(j)}$ *Mdn*	$r_{wg(j)}$ Range	$r_{wg(j)}$ Branches ≥ .70	ICC(1)	ICC(2)
Branch conflict cultures						
Collaborative	.80	.88	.00–1.00	85%	.14	.48**
Dominating	.81	.88	.00–.97	89%	.15	.51**
Avoidant	.75	.82	.00–.99	74%	.04	.20*
Leader conflict behaviors						
Collaborative	.84	.90	.00–.99	88%	.10	.38**
Dominating	.83	.87	.00–1.00	90%	.05	.21*
Avoidant	.77	.86	.00–1.00	79%	.10	.40**
Viability						
Cohesion	.75	.89	.00–1.00	75%	.20	.58**
Potency	.82	.89	.00–.98	82%	.13	.46**
Burnout	.77	.87	.00–.98	76%	.05	.24*
Validity data						
Psychological safety	.47	.55	.00–.99	33%	.11	.40**
Distributive justice	.59	.67	.00–.97	47%	.05	.24*
Procedural justice	.73	.82	.00–.99	70%	.02	.08
Interpersonal justice	.72	.85	.00–1.00	71%	.07	.28**
Learning climate	.80	.87	.00–1.00	79%	.08	.33**
Performance climate	.75	.81	.00–.97	75%	.09	.37**
Control variables						
Task conflict	.71	.79	.00–1.00	69%	.07	.30**
Relationship conflict	.75	.85	.00–1.00	74%	.15	.51**

Note. When calculating $r_{wg(j)}$, we assumed a rectangular null distribution (see James, Demaree, & Wolf, 1984). ICC = intraclass correlation.
* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$.

Paul, 1998; Schulte, Ostroff, Shmulyian, & Kinicki, 2009). Moreover, given that ICC(2) values represent the reliability of the group means, lower ICC(2) values result in a more conservative test of our hypotheses. In all, these results support the theory that perceptions of conflict cultures are at least partially shared within organizational units, and the results provide support for aggregating the conflict culture measure to the unit level.

Leader conflict management behaviors. Akin to the analyses for conflict cultures, we examined whether members' reports of managers' conflict behaviors are also differentiable into collaborative, dominating, and avoidant styles. We performed an EFA with maximum likelihood estimation and varimax rotation to assess the factor structure of the measure. The analysis supported a three-factor solution ($\lambda_1 = 3.64$, $\lambda_2 = 1.47$, $\lambda_3 = 1.22$, $\lambda_{4-12} < 1.00$; 40.68% variance explained), in which all items (with the exception of one dominating item at .37) had loadings higher than .40 on the intended factor and loadings lower than .40 on the remaining factors (see Appendix B for factor loadings).

Similar to conflict cultures, we expect member perceptions of leaders' conflict management behaviors to be shared, albeit imperfectly. We therefore calculated $r_{wg(j)}$, ICC(1) and ICC(2) values to determine whether members agree on the managers' conflict management behaviors. As shown in Table 1, the average $r_{wg(j)}$ value across branches was well above the recommended value of .70 (collaborative: mean $r_{wg[j]} = .84$, median $r_{wg[j]} = .90$; dominating: mean $r_{wg[j]} = .83$, median $r_{wg[j]} = .87$; avoidant: mean $r_{wg[j]} = .77$, median $r_{wg[j]} = .86$). The ICC values were statistically significant for collaborative (ICC[1] = .10, $p < .01$), dominating (ICC[1] = .05, $p < .05$), and avoidant (ICC[1] = .10, $p < .01$). Once again, the ICC(2) values were low (collaborative: .38; dominating: .21; avoidant: .40), thus providing a conservative test of our hypotheses. These results provide reasonable support that perceptions of leaders' conflict management behaviors are at least partially shared within organizational units and that aggregating the measure to the unit level is justified (cf. Klein et al., 2000).

Table 1 also shows aggregation statistics for all unit-level outcomes, including unit viability outcomes (cohesion, potency, and burnout), validity data (e.g., justice climate, psychological safety climate, and learning and performance orientation climates), and control variables (i.e., relationship and task conflict). As can be seen, there is general support for the notion that they are constructs that are at least partially shared and have meaning at the unit level.

Convergent and Divergent Validity

The factor analyses and aggregation statistics support the validity of conflict culture constructs by providing evidence that the three conflict culture types can be differentiated from one another and exist at the unit level of analysis. To establish construct validity, however, it is also important to provide evidence of convergent and divergent validity (Nunnally, 1978). Thus, we assessed the extent to which each conflict type was related to, but distinct from, several additional climate constructs, including psychological safety climate, justice climate, learning climate, and performance climate. To establish divergent validity, we conducted a CFA at the individual level to show that the three conflict culture types are distinct from each additional climate construct. A nine-factor model that included separate factors for each conflict culture type, psychological safety climate, each of the three justice climate types, learning climate, and performance climate fit the data well (CFI = .93, RMSEA = .05), $\chi^2(491) = 1{,}312.91$, $p < .01$, and significantly better than a one-factor model in which all items indicated a single latent construct (CFI = .47, RMSEA = .13), $\chi^2(527) = 7{,}063.27$, $p < .00$; $\Delta\chi^2(36) = 5{,}750.36$, $p < .00$. This illustrates that conflict cultures are distinct from other unit-level climates.

Consistent with prior efforts to establish convergent validity (e.g., Colquitt, 2001), we also assessed the correlations between the three conflict culture types and the other climate measures at the branch level (see Table 2). Consistent with predictions, collaborative conflict cultures were positively correlated with psychological safety ($r = .56$, $p < .01$), all three justice climates (distributive: $r = .42$; procedural: $r = .41$; interpersonal: $r = .31$; all ps $< .01$), and learning climate ($r = .64$, $p < .01$). As expected, dominating conflict cultures were negatively related to psychological safety climate ($r = -.57$, $p < .01$), all three justice climates (distributive: $r = -.34$, $p < .01$; procedural: $r = -.33$, $p < .01$; interpersonal: $r = -.33$, $p < .05$), and learning climate ($r = -.57$, $p < .01$). The correlation between dominating cultures and performance orientation climate was positive in direction, but not significant ($r = .11$, $p > .05$). Finally, as expected, avoidant conflict cultures were negatively related to psychological safety climate ($r = -.20$, $p < .05$), distributive justice climate ($r = -.20$, $p < .05$), and learning climate ($r = -.32$, $p < .01$); however, avoidant cultures were unrelated to procedural ($r = -.07$, $p > .05$) and interpersonal ($r = -.06$, $p > .05$) justice climates. In all, these results support the convergent and divergent validity of the three conflict culture types.

Hypothesis Testing

Table 3 contains the branch-level means, standard deviations, and intercorrelations for the study variables. We used hierarchical ordinary least squares regression to test our hypotheses. We con-

Table 2
Validity Data

Variable	Collaborative conflict cultures	Dominating conflict cultures	Avoidant conflict cultures
Psychological safety climate	.56**	−.57**	−.20*
Distributive justice climate	.42**	−.34**	−.20*
Procedural justice climate	.41**	−.33**	−.07
Interpersonal justice climate	.31**	−.33**	−.06
Learning orientation climate	.64**	−.57**	−.32**
Performance orientation climate	.03	.11	−.08

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$.

Table 3
Means, Standard Deviations, and Bivariate Correlations Among Study Variables

Variable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15
1. Branch size	—														
2. Leader gender	−.09	—													
3. Task conflict	.01	−.09	(.76)												
4. Relationship conflict	.01	**−.21**	**.72**	(.82)											
5. Collaborative conflict behaviors	.17	.18	**−.23**	**−.34**	(.74)										
6. Dominating conflict behaviors	.08	−.18	**.30**	**.29**	**−.36**	(.61)									
7. Avoidant conflict behaviors	.01	−.12	.16	**.32**	**−.52**	**.42**	(.70)								
8. Collaborative conflict cultures	.01	.17	**−.52**	**−.72**	**.41**	**−.28**	**−.32**	(.87)							
9. Dominating conflict cultures	.04	**−.25**	**.59**	**.72**	**−.45**	**.26**	**.31**	**−.74**	(.79)						
10. Avoidant conflict cultures	.10	−.13	.01	**.26**	**−.21**	.01	**.23**	**−.35**	**.26**	(.66)					
11. Branch cohesion	.03	.04	**−.54**	**−.72**	**.36**	**−.32**	**−.28**	**.66**	**−.64**	**−.27**	(.88)				
12. Branch potency	.11	.17	**−.33**	**−.39**	**.26**	**−.21**	−.17	**.48**	**−.34**	**−.19**	**.56**	(.87)			
13. Branch burnout	.02	**−.26**	**.34**	**.49**	**−.19**	.16	.13	**−.50**	**.42**	**.20**	**−.41**	**−.38**	(.91)		
14. Branch creativity	.06	.01	**−.22**	**−.28**	.14	−.03	**−.40**	**.25**	**−.21**	**−.28**	**.30**	**.33**	−.11	(.92)	
15. Branch customer service	.02	−.03	.04	.04	.04	.07	.10	−.08	−.13	−.04	.10	.00	−.10	.03	—
M	5.67	1.34	2.11	2.19	3.39	2.18	2.52	3.44	2.76	2.95	5.42	4.02	2.39	2.75	0.85
SD	2.43	0.48	0.43	0.49	0.35	0.32	0.40	0.45	0.44	0.35	0.72	0.44	0.44	0.77	0.14
N	131	92	131	131	131	131	131	131	131	131	131	131	131	92	54

Note. Significant correlations ($p < .05$) are in bold. Values in parentheses on the diagonal are Cronbach's alpha coefficients.

trolled for branch size in all analyses. We also controlled for leader gender to account for the possibility that leader gender is related to the type of conflict culture that emerges within a branch. Finally, we controlled for task and relationship conflict because we were interested in the outcomes associated with different types of conflict cultures, regardless of the degree and type of conflict present within the branch. We used directional tests for our hypotheses.

Hypothesis 1 states that leaders' collaborative, avoidant, and dominating conflict behaviors will be positively related to collaborative, avoidant, and dominating conflict cultures, respectively. As shown in Table 4, these hypotheses were largely supported. Collaborative leader behaviors were positively related to collaborative conflict cultures ($\beta = .24$, $t = 2.90$, $p < .01$). Avoidant leader behaviors were positively related to avoidant cultures ($\beta = .24$, $t = 2.07$, $p < .05$), and both collaborative leader behaviors ($\beta = -.20$, $t = -1.70$, $p < .05$) and dominating leader behaviors were negatively related to avoidant cultures ($\beta = -.24$, $t = -2.22$, $p < .05$). Dominating leader behaviors were unrelated to dominating cultures ($\beta = -.02$, $t = -.22$, $p > .05$), yet collaborative leader behaviors were negatively related to dominating cultures ($\beta = -.22$, $t = -2.78$, $p < .01$).

We also theorized that conflict cultures will have consequences for branch viability (i.e., cohesion, potency, and burnout) and performance, specifically, customer service quality and creativity. Hypothesis 2 states that branches with collaborative conflict cultures will have high levels of viability but that branches with dominating conflict cultures will have low levels of viability. As shown in Table 5, these hypotheses were largely supported. Collaborative conflict cultures were positively related to cohesion ($\beta = .24$, $t = 2.39$, $p < .01$) and potency ($\beta = .46$, $t = 3.01$, $p < .01$), and negatively related to burnout ($\beta = -.33$, $t = -2.29$, $p < .05$). By contrast, dominating conflict cultures were negatively related to cohesion ($\beta = -.29$, $t = -2.74$, $p < .01$), but were unrelated to potency ($\beta = .09$, $t = .56$, $p > .05$) and burnout ($\beta = .17$, $t = 1.18$, $p > .05$). Avoidant cultures were unrelated to unit viability.

In terms of performance, Hypothesis 3 states that branches with avoidant conflict cultures will have low levels of creativity. As shown in Table 5, and in support of our prediction, avoidant conflict cultures were negatively related to managers' ratings of branch creativity ($\beta = -.23$, $t = -1.99$, $p < .05$). Finally, Hypothesis 4 states that branches with dominating conflict cultures will have low-quality customer service as rated by an independent consulting firm, whereas branches with collaborative conflict cultures have higher quality customer service. As shown in Table 5, and in partial support of Hypothesis 4, dominating conflict cultures were negatively related to customer service ($\beta = -.41$, $t = -1.90$, $p < .05$), but collaborative conflict cultures were unrelated to customer service ($\beta = -.30$, $t = -1.22$, $p > .05$).

Common methods bias. The variables used to test some of our hypotheses were gathered from the same source, namely, the employee survey. We therefore conducted two analyses to assess the likelihood that common method variance provides an alternative explanation for the findings. First, we conducted a Harman one-factor test (Harman, 1967), one of the most widely used tests for assessing the extent of common method variance present in a data set. Specifically, we ran an individual level EFA that included all of the items for all of the constructs of

Table 4
Leader Conflict Management Behaviors as Predictors of Branch Conflict Cultures

Variable	Collaborative conflict cultures		Dominating conflict cultures		Avoidant conflict cultures	
	β	*t*	β	*t*	β	*t*
Step 1						
Branch size	.09	1.31	.00	−0.05	.08	0.77
Leader gender (1 = Male, 2 = Female)	.03	0.36	−.11	−1.64	−.04	−0.42
Task conflict	−.06	−0.52	.20	1.98*	−.26	−1.76*
Relationship conflict	−.70	−6.35**	.59	5.77**	.53	3.46**
Step 2						
Leader collaborative conflict behaviors	.24	2.90**	−.22	−2.78**	−.20	−1.70*
Leader dominating conflict behaviors	−.04	−0.48	−.02	−0.22	−.24	−2.22*
Leader avoidant conflict behaviors	−.03	−0.35	−.01	−0.15	.24	2.07*
$R^2_{\text{Step 1}}$	.56**		.62**		.15	
$\Delta R^2_{\text{Step 1–Step 2}}$	.07**		.03 *		.12**	
R^2_{model}	.63**		.65**		.27**	

Note. $N = 92$ branches.
* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$ (one-tailed).

interest that were rated by employees (the three leader conflict behavior types, the three conflict culture types, cohesion, potency, and burnout). Nine factors emerged from this analysis, and all items loaded as expected (i.e., all items for a given construct loaded on a single factor, with no cross-loadings of any items). The average item loading on the intended construct was .62. Of the 336 potential cross-loadings, all were less than .35. The lack of cross-loadings is consistent with the conclusion that common method bias is not a major rival hypothesis in this study.

Second, we also assessed the impact of common method variance on the study findings by including a measure of trait negative affect in the employee survey, a variable that has been theorized to be a source of common method variance (cf. Brannick, Chan, Conway, Lance, & Spector, 2010; Podsakoff et al., 2003). We reran all of the study analyses controlling for the mean level of trait negative affect in each branch and found identical statistical conclusions (full results available upon request). In all, these results support the idea that common method variance does not provide an alternative explanation for our findings.

Discussion

As conflict is inherent in any organizational system, it is not surprising that conflict management has received much attention in the organizational behavior literature. Yet to date, most, if not all of this work has had a decidedly micro focus, examining conflict management processes and their consequences at the individual and small-group levels of analysis. At the same time, work on organizational culture is devoid of any specific focus on conflict. This disconnect is problematic because there is good reason to assume organizations develop distinct conflict cultures that have, in both the short- and long term, consequences for organizational viability and performance. Accordingly, a key contribution of the present research is that we provide evidence that conflict cultures can exist at the organizational level and that cultures can be

Table 5
The Relationship Between Conflict Cultures and Branch-Level Outcomes

Variable	Branch cohesion ($N = 92$)		Branch potency ($N = 92$)		Branch burnout ($N = 92$)		Branch creativity ($N = 92$)		Branch customer service ($N = 54$)	
	β	*t*	β	*t*	β	*t*	β	*t*	β	*t*
Step 1										
Branch size	−.04	−0.56	.17	1.75*	−.04	−0.47	.05	0.51	.02	0.12
Leader gender	−.13	−1.86*	.13	1.24	−.16	−1.77*	−.04	−0.37	−.03	−0.18
Task conflict	−.04	−0.41	−.12	−0.83	−.01	−0.07	.00	−0.03	.03	0.12
Relationship conflict	−.76	−7.28**	−.22	−1.46	.51	3.74**	−.28	−1.78*	.01	0.06
Step 2										
Collaborative conflict cultures	.24	2.39**	.46	3.01**	−.33	−2.29*	.01	0.08	−.30	−1.22
Dominating conflict cultures	−.29	−2.74**	.09	0.56	.17	1.18	.06	0.32	−.41	−1.90*
Avoidant conflict cultures	−.07	−.96	−.11	−1.07	−.05	−0.55	−.23	−1.99*	−.09	−0.52
$R^2_{\text{step 1}}$	.60**		.16**		.32**		.08		.00	
$\Delta R^2_{\text{Step 1–Step 2}}$	.09**		.12**		.07*		.05		.09	
R^2_{model}	.69**		.28**		.39**		.13*		.09	

Note. The analysis sample size differs across models due to varying degrees of available data for the dependent variables.
* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$ (one-tailed).

identified as collaborative, dominating, or avoidant. These findings corroborate anecdotal impressions reported in the popular press and speculations advanced in the scholarly literature (De Dreu et al., 2004; Gelfand et al., 2008), and advance the conflict literature by adding a third, overarching level of analysis to the contemporary focus on individual and small-group (team) levels of analysis (e.g., De Church & Marks, 2001; De Dreu, 2006; De Dreu & Weingart, 2003a; Jehn, 1995; Jehn & Mannix, 2001; Lovelace et al., 2001; Pruitt & Rubin, 1986; Simons & Peterson, 2000; Tjosvold, 1998; Ury et al., 1988; Van de Vliert, 1997).

Leader Affordances of Conflict Cultures

In addition to identifying distinct conflict cultures, we set out to test specific hypotheses regarding the organizational factors that promote distinct conflict cultures. This research specifically showed the important role of leaders' behavior in conflict cultures in organizations. To date, the literatures on leadership and conflict have been largely isolated. Drawing on early work by Lewin and colleagues (1939) and extant research that has shown that specific leader behaviors (e.g., safety, service) are associated with related unit-level criteria (Barling et al., 2002; Schneider et al., 2005; Zohar, 2002), we theorized that through their own behaviors, leaders model what is an appropriate and a normative way to manage conflict in the unit. We indeed showed that leaders' cooperative conflict management styles were related to collaborative conflict cultures, whereas leaders' avoidant conflict styles were related to avoidant conflict cultures. Collaborative leader behaviors were also negatively related to dominating conflict cultures. Accordingly, this research shows the important connection between how leaders manage conflict and conflict cultures in organizations, forging linkages between the leadership literature, which tends to ignore conflict, and the conflict literature, which tends to ignore leadership.

Although we have found evidence for how leaders' behaviors are linked with avoidant, collaborative, and dominating cultures, we clearly have not examined all possible factors that could facilitate these conflict cultures. For example, leaders who are "toxic," are highly aggressive, and have a strong "proving-" or performance-oriented leadership style (Van de Walle, 1997) may also create dominating conflict cultures. Likewise, highly charismatic and transformational leaders might facilitate the development of collaborative conflict cultures. Leaders who emphasize extreme relationality (unmitigated communion; Amanatullah, Morris, & Curhan, 2008) might facilitate avoidant conflict cultures. Leaders' personality traits might also be a driving force of conflict cultures. For example, leaders who have a high need for closure—who prefer order, predictability, and consensus, and who dislike option diversity and dissenting views (Kruglanski, Pierro, Mannetti, & De Grada, 2006; Kruglanski & Webster, 1996)—might promote an avoidant conflict culture. Likewise, the Big Five personality traits might also be related to conflict cultures; agreeable leaders are likely to facilitate collaborative conflict cultures, whereas disagreeable leaders are likely to facilitate dominating conflict cultures.

We also expect that the three distinct conflict cultures can emerge through bottom-up influences (e.g., attraction-selection-attrition [ASA] and shared sense-making). Schneider's (1987) ASA model suggests that when an individual's values, attitudes, and personality match the dominant values, attitudes, and personality of an organizational unit, that individual is likely to be attracted to the organization, selected as a member of the organization, and remain a member. At the aggregate level (e.g., organizations or units within organizations), the ASA process yields (quasi) homogeneity of personality, which through daily interactions, information sharing, and shared sense-making establish norms for social conduct (Schneider, 1987). It is through such bottom-up processes that characteristics of individuals become amplified and have emergent characteristics at higher levels of analysis (Kozlowski & Klein, 2000). In the case of conflict cultures, we would theorize that because organizations attract and select individuals with different personalities, they develop distinguishable conflict cultures. For example, we might expect that organizations in which members who are agreeable are selected are likely to develop collaborating conflict cultures, whereas dominating cultures emerge when members who are selected are disagreeable. By contrast, employee introversion might be associated with the development of avoidant conflict cultures, whereas employee extraversion will be positively related with dominating conflict cultures.

Beyond leader and member characteristics, more macro factors such as organizational structure, industry, and national culture are likely to have an impact on the emergence of distinct conflict culture types (Gelfand et al., 2008). We would predict, for example, that dominating cultures would be likely to emerge in organizations that have low centralization; low formalization; and highly competitive reward structures; in organizations in highly competitive industries; and in national cultures that are characterized by high vertical individualism, masculinity, and looseness (Gelfand et al., 2011; Hofstede, 1980; Triandis & Gelfand, 1998). Avoidant cultures, by contrast, are more likely to develop in organizations that have high centralization; high formalization; and cooperative reward structures; in organizations in low-growth and stable industries; and in national cultures characterized by vertical collectivism, uncertainty avoidance, and tightness (Gelfand et al., 2011; Hofstede, 1980; Triandis & Gelfand, 1998). Finally, collaborative conflict cultures are more likely to develop in organizations with low centralization, low formalization, and highly cooperative reward structures, in high-growth and dynamic industries, and in national cultures that are loose and characterized by horizontal collectivism and femininity. This research, accordingly, opens up a number of possibilities for future research on the multilevel determinants of conflict cultures.

Outcomes of Conflict Cultures

Another contribution of this research is that we uncovered relationships between distinct conflict cultures, on the one hand, and indicators of organizational viability and effectiveness, on the other. Avoidant cultures negatively related to branch-level creativity, whereas dominating cultures negatively associated with customer service and cohesion. Reversely, collaborative conflict cultures positively related to organizational viability—cohesion and potency—and lower levels of burnout. Accordingly, the study of conflict cultures provides not only a means for describing what is normative within organizations but also insight into the likelihood of its success in carrying out its goals and objectives. This is among the few studies

showing that conflict management has implications for organizational level outcomes.

Future research could also extend beyond the consequences investigated here and investigate the linkages between conflict cultures and additional organizational consequences, such as risk taking, absenteeism and turnover, longevity, and efficiency. Conflict cultures might also have cross-level effects in organizations, impacting individuals' satisfaction and commitment, among other organizational attitudes. Future research also needs to probe *moderators* of the relationship between conflict cultures and organization and individual level outcomes. For example, the relationship between conflict cultures and outcomes would likely be stronger in organizational contexts in which tasks are interdependent, jobs are complex, there is frequent interaction, conditions are stable, and tenure is high. By contrast, conflict cultures would likely exert weaker effects in organizational contexts in which people work relatively autonomously, jobs are routine, there is little interaction, and in contexts where tenure is low. Assessing the different *mediators* that account for conflict culture to outcome relations is also an important agenda for future research. For example, the relationship between avoidant conflict cultures and low creativity may be a function of low information sharing, whereas the relationship between dominating conflict cultures and poor customer service might be a function of low-quality interpersonal relationships, which is an important foundation of customer service (Schneider, Ehrhart, & Macey, 2011). Finally, a conflict cultures perspective has the potential to enrich conflict theory by adding an important boundary condition to the idiosyncratic preferences individuals may have for particular conflict management strategies; that is, it will enable us to better understand when and why individuals prefer certain conflict management strategies over others in organizational contexts.

Practical Implications

Aside from these theory-related contributions, the present conflict culture perspective also has potential implications for practice. Historically, the impact of conflict management has been examined mostly at the individual and small-group levels of analysis. As we increasingly understand the relationship of conflict cultures and organizational outcomes, and research continues to document conflict cultures' top-down and bottom-up antecedents, this research will begin to show the value of conflict scholarship for top managers. As well, a conflict culture paradigm invites new diagnostic tools and mechanisms for implementing systematic change in organizations. Given that leaders' styles are important correlates of conflict cultures, it is possible for organizations to strategically select and/or train leaders to create different conflict cultures in organizations given certain organizational goals. It also suggests that leaders need to be made aware that their own conflict management styles have impact far beyond their interactions with specific employees and extend to the unit as a whole. As Schneider (1987) remarked, the people make the place, and thus individual differences not only affect individual performance but also affect the creation of organizational cultures. More generally, conflict cultures, like other aspects of culture, can be challenged, contested, and changed. Accordingly, as we continue to understand the multilevel factors that affect conflict cultures, we will be in a better position to help with organizational change efforts dealing with a fundamental aspect of all organizational systems—conflict—through a systems approach that moves beyond the individual level that dominates the conflict management literature.

Limitations

As in all research, this study has a number of limitations. First, common method variance could be seen as a potential validity threat to our study. However, there are several reasons this concern applies less to the present data and conclusions. First, growing evidence questions the concern that collecting data from the same source threatens the validity of a study (Brannick et al., 2010; Doty & Glick, 1998; Lance, Dawson, Birkelbach, & Hoffman, 2010; Spector 1987, 2006). In fact, common method variance can either inflate or deflate observed relationships (Siemsen, Roth, & Oliveira, 2010), and many of the factors assumed to produce method variance do not necessarily do so (see Spector, 2006, for a review). As a precaution, we incorporated a number of features into our methodological design that reduce method bias (using different response scales, interspersing other measures between the measures of interest, and reducing participant apprehension). We also conducted a Harmon one-factor test and reran the analyses controlling for negative affect, and the results of both of these analyses was that common method variance was of little concern. In addition, we also included several variables that could be influenced by common method variance in our analyses (e.g., multiple dimensions of conflict behaviors and conflict cultures), and research demonstrates that any potential impact of common method bias is reduced in multiple regression equations that include several variables gathered from the same source (Siemsen et al., 2010). Finally, we gathered data from a variety of independent sources, including an employee survey, a leader survey, and the organization's archival records, and numerous hypotheses were tested using data gathered from distinct sources. In all, method bias does not pose a serious concern for the conclusions drawn.

It is also important to note that all data were gathered at a similar point in time, and this precludes causal inferences. We theorize that leader behaviors influence the development of distinct conflict cultures. Statistically, however, we cannot rule out the possibility that conflict cultures instead caused the leaders' conflict management behaviors. We also theorized that distinct conflict cultures shape organizational outcomes, including creativity, customer service, and viability. Future longitudinal research is needed to determine whether this model is correct, or whether organizational outcomes instead influence conflict cultures. More generally, research on conflict cultures should incorporate methodologies that allow for greater causal inference and that lend additional confidence to survey research such as that reported in this article. For example, experimental designs, as in Lewin et al.'s (1939) original research, are well suited for this purpose. With such methods, leader behaviors can be manipulated to reflect a dominating, avoiding, or collaborative approach to emerging (or experimenter-induced) conflicts, and follower conflict behavior as well as overall group viability and performance can be assessed. Ultimately, such experiments may be extended over longer periods of time, even allowing members to leave and newcomers to self-select (or be selected) into the group. Although logistically difficult, such experiments are needed to provide conclusive evidence

about the impact of leader conflict behavior on the emergence of conflict cultures and their subsequent effects on unit-level outcomes.

Furthermore, we did not examine the specific ways in which conflict cultures emerge in this study. Our theory suggests that conflict cultures emerge through composition processes; that is, individual conflict management preferences converge around at least partially shared, normative means for handling conflict due to the strong situations afforded by organizational contexts. This assumption is theoretically justifiable, given that conflict management is inherently an interpersonal phenomenon, and interpersonal interactions, which serve to constrain idiosyncratic behavior and define shared norms, are the hallmark of composition-based emergence (cf. Kozlowski & Klein, 2000). Moreover, the notion that conflict cultures are shared constructs that emerge through composition is consistent with prior theorizing on other types of organizational culture (e.g., Martin, 1992; O'Reilly & Chatman, 1996). Finally, the empirical evidence we present also supports the idea that conflict cultures emerge through composition processes; there was greater variation in conflict cultures between than within organizational units as well as evidence of within-unit agreement in conflict culture type.

Nevertheless, perceptions of conflict cultures were not perfectly shared in all organizational units (i.e., there was a range of r_{wg} values across units). Thus, although conflict cultures often emerge through composition, they may at times be characterized by other forms of emergence defined by multilevel theorists (e.g., Kozlowski & Klein, 2000). It is also possible, for example, that in some units, conflict culture emergence takes on a less pure form of composition—such as *pooled constrained emergence*—in which shared norms emerge but there is also some variation in conflict management behaviors. Alternatively, conflict culture emergence could at times be characterized by *minimum/maximum emergence*, in which certain extreme conflict management behaviors "win out" over others in terms of defining the conflict culture (Kozlowski & Klein, 2000). For example, Weingart and colleagues (2007) showed that teams composed of some individuals with cooperative goals and some individuals with competitive goals converged to an all-competitive team (see also Kelley & Stahelski, 1970; Smeesters, Warlop, Van Avermaet, Corneille, & Yzerbyt, 2003; Steinel, De Dreu, Ouwehand, & Ramirez-Marin, 2009; Ten Velden, Beersma, & De Dreu, 2007; Van Lange, 1992). It is also possible that conflict cultures are at times characterized by *patterned emergence*, in that they are characterized by significant variation within the unit. For example, two or more conflict cultures exist simultaneously within a unit, such that a subset of members use dominating conflict management behaviors, whereas others avoid engaging in conflict openly. Indeed, conflict culture strength (e.g., variation in the unit) and its antecedents and consequences are also important directions for future research. More generally, the possibility that conflict culture emergence is often the result of composition, but at times may be the result of pooled constrained, minimum/maximum, or patterned emergence, is consistent with extant multilevel theory that suggests that the same phenomena can emerge through distinct process (Kozlowski & Klein, 2000). Research on the conditions under which conflict culture emergence may take on forms other than composition is an exciting frontier of conflict research.

Finally, although we examined avoidant, collaborative, and dominating conflict cultures, these are not the only conflict cultures that might develop in organizations: It is possible that conflict cultures might develop that are *passive aggressive* in which norms favor disagreeable norms (like dominating cultures) but are also highly passive where conflict is not dealt with in an open manner (like avoidant cultures) (Gelfand et al., 2008). Future work should seek to provide evidence for the existence of passive-aggressive conflict cultures as well as other potential conflict culture types.

Conclusion

The conflict cultures paradigm has the potential to expand the theoretical and practical scope of the field. As with other aspects of organizational culture, conflict cultures relate to leader behaviors and are linked to organizational level outcomes in predictable and meaningful ways. More generally, the perspective on conflict management advanced in this article expands conflict research beyond the micro level and contributes to a growing multilevel science of organizational behavior. Many phenomena in organizations—whether it is innovation, leadership, or job attitudes—involve multiple levels of analysis, and conflict management is of no exception. Moreover, as we have shown here, conflict management norms and practices become part and parcel of the fabric of organizational life, and their implication for organizational survival and prosperity should receive more consideration in organizational theory and practice.

References

Amanatullah, E., Morris, M. W., & Curhan, J. R. (2008). Negotiators who give too much: Unmitigated communion, relational anxieties, and economic costs in distributive and integrative bargaining. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 95,* 723–738. doi:10.1037/a0012612

Argyris, C. (1971). Management information systems: The challenge to rationality and emotionality. *Management Science, 17,* B275–B292. doi:10.1287/mnsc.17.6.B275

Barling, J., Loughlin, C. A., & Kelloway, E. K. (2002). Developmental test of a model linking safety-specific transformational leadership and occupational injuries. *Journal of Applied Psychology, 87,* 488–496. doi:10.1037/0021-9010.87.3.488

Beersma, B., & De Dreu, C. K. W. (2005). Conflict's consequences: Effects of social motives on postnegotiation creative and convergent group functioning and performance. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 89,* 358–374. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.89.3.358

Blake, R. R., & Mouton, J. S. (1964). *The managerial grid*. Houston, TX: Gulf.

Bliese, P. D. (2000). Within-group agreement, non-independence, and reliability: Implications for data aggregation and analysis. In K. J. Klein & S. W. J. Kozlowski (Eds.), *Multilevel theory, research, and methods in organizations: Foundations, extensions, and new directions* (pp. 349–381). San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.

Brannick, M. T., Chan, D., Conway, J. M., Lance, C. E., & Spector, P. E. (2010). What is method variance and how can we cope with it? A panel discussion. *Organizational Research Methods, 13,* 407–420. doi:10.1177/1094428109360993

Bunderson, J. S., & Sutcliff, K. M. (2003). Management team learning orientation and business unit performance. *Journal of Applied Psychology, 88,* 552–560. doi:10.1037/0021-9010.88.3.552

Chen, G., Liu, C., & Tjosvold, D. (2005). Conflict management for effective top management teams and innovation in China. *Journal of*

Management Studies, 42, 277–300. doi:10.1111/j.1467-6486.2005.00497.x

Colquitt, J. A. (2001). On the dimensionality of organizational justice: A construct validation of a measure. *Journal of Applied Psychology, 86,* 386–400. doi:10.1037/0021-9010.86.3.386

Constantino, C. A., & Merchant, C. S. (1996). *Designing conflict management systems: A guide to creating productive and healthy organizations*. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.

De Church, L. A., & Marks, M. A. (2001). Maximizing the benefits of task conflict: The role of conflict management. *International Journal of Conflict Management, 12,* 4–22. doi:10.1108/eb022847

De Dreu, C. K. W. (2006). When too much and too little hurts: Evidence for a curvilinear relationship between task conflict and innovation in teams. *Journal of Management, 32,* 83–107. doi:10.1177/0149206305277795

De Dreu, C. K. W. (2007). Coopertive outcome interdependance task reflexivity and team effectiveness: A motivated processing approach. *Journal of Applied Psychology, 92,* 628–638. doi:10.1037/0021-9010.92.3.628

De Dreu, C. K. W., Evers, A., Beersma, B., Kluwer, E. S., & Nauta, A. (2001). A theory-based measure of conflict management strategies in the workplace. *Journal of Organizational Behavior, 22,* 645–668. doi:10.1002/job.107

De Dreu, C. K. W., & Gelfand, M. J. (Eds.). (2008). *The psychology of conflict and conflict management in organizations*. New York, NY: Erlbaum.

De Dreu, C. K. W., van Dierendonck, D., & Dijkstra, M. T. (2004). Conflict at work and individual well-being. *International Journal of Conflict Management, 15,* 6–26. doi:10.1108/eb022905

De Dreu, C. K. W., & van Vianen, A. E. M. (2001). Managing relationship conflict and the effectiveness of organizational teams. *Journal of Organizational Behavior, 22,* 309–328. doi:10.1002/job.71

De Dreu, C. K. W., & Weingart, L. R. (2003a). Task versus relationship conflict, team perfomance and team member satisfaction: A meta-analysis. *Journal of Applied Psychology, 88,* 741–749. doi:10.1037/0021-9010.88.4.741

De Dreu, C. K. W., & Weingart, L. R. (2003b). Toward a contingency theory of conflict and performance in groups and organizational teams. In M. A. West, D. Tjosvold, & K. Smith (Eds.), *International handbook of organizational teamwork and cooperative working* (pp. 151–166) Chichester, UK: Wiley.

De Dreu, C. K. W., & West, M. A. (2001). Minority dissent and team innovation: The importance of participation in decision making. *Journal of Applied Psychology, 86,* 1191–1201. doi:10.1037/0021-9010.86.6.1191

DeLisi, P. S. (1998). A modern-day tragedy. *Journal of Management Inquiry, 7,* 118–130. doi:10.1177/105649269872005

Deutsch, M. (1949). A theory of cooperation and competition. *Human Relations, 2,* 129–152. doi:10.1177/001872674900200204

Dobbins, G. H., & Zaccaro, S. J. (1986). The effects of group cohesion and leader behavior on subordinate satisfaction. *Group & Organization Studies, 11,* 203–219. doi:10.1177/105960118601100305

Doty, D. H., & Glick, W. H. (1998). Common methods bias: Does common methods variance really bias the results? *Organizational Research Methods, 1,* 374–406. doi:10.1177/109442819814002

Dragoni, L. (2005). *Understanding state goal orientation: Leadership and work-group climate as key antecedents* (Unpublished doctoral dissertation). University of Maryland, College Park.

Edmondson, A. (1999). Psychological safety and learning behavior in work teams. *Administrative Science Quarterly, 44,* 350–383. doi:10.2307/2666999

Finkelstein, S. (2005). When bad things happen to good companies: Strategy failure and flawed executives. *Journal of Business Strategy, 26,* 19–28. doi:10.1108/02756660510586300

Gelfand, M. J., Leslie, L. M., & Keller, K. (2008). On the etiology of organizational conflict cultures. *Research in Organizational Behavior, 28,* 137–166. doi:10.1016/j.riob.2008.06.001

Gelfand, M. J., Raver, J. L., Nishii, L., Leslie, L. M., Lun, J., Lim, B. C., . . . Yamaguchi, S. (2011, May 27). Differences between tight and loose cultures: A 33-nation study. *Science, 332,* 1100–1104. doi:10.1126/science.1197754

Gittell, J. H. (2003). *The Southwest Airlines way: Using the power of relationships to achieve high performance*. New York, NY: McGraw-Hill.

Goncalo, J. A., & Staw, B. M. (2006). Individualism–collectivism and group creativity. *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 100,* 96–109.

Harman, H. H. (1967). *Modern factor analysis*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Hofstede, G. (1980). *Culture's consequences: International differences in work-related values*. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.

Hogg, M. A. (2010). Influence and leadership. In S. T. Fiske, D. T. Gilbert, & G. Lindzey (Eds.), *The handbook of social psychology* (5th ed., pp. 1166–1207).New York, NY: Wiley.

House, R. J., Hanges, P. J., Javidan, M., Dorfman, P. W., & Gupta, V. (Eds.). (2004). *Cultures, leadership and organizations: A 62 nation GLOBE study*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Jaffee, D. (2008). Conflict at work throughout the history of organizations. In C. K. W. De Dreu & M. J. Gelfand (Eds.), *The psychology of conflict and conflict management in organizations* (pp. 55–77). New York, NY: Erlbaum.

James, L. R., Demaree, R. G., & Wolf, G. (1984). Estimating within-group interrater reliability with and without response bias. *Journal of Applied Psychology, 69,* 85–98. doi:10.1037/0021-9010.69.1.85

Janssen, O., & van de Vliert, E. (1996). Concern for the other's goals: Key to (de-) escalation of conflict. *International Journal of Conflict Management, 7,* 99–120. doi:10.1108/eb022777

Jehn, K. (1995). A multimethod examination of the benefits and detriments of intragroup conflict. *Administrative Science Quarterly, 40,* 256–282. doi:10.2307/2393638

Jehn, K., & Mannix, E. A. (2001). The dynamic nature of conflict: A longitudinal study of intragroup conflict and group performance. *Academy of Management Journal, 44,* 238–251. doi:10.2307/3069453

Johns, G. (2006). The essential impact of context on organizational behavior. *Academy of Management Review, 31,* 386–408. doi:10.5465/AMR.2006.20208687

Katz, D., & Kahn, R. L. (1978). *The social psychology of organizing*. New York, NY: McGraw-Hill.

Kelley, H. H., & Stahelski, A. J. (1970). Social interaction basis of cooperators and competitors beliefs about others. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 16,* 66–91. doi:10.1037/h0029849

Kirkman, B. L., Rosen, B., Tesluk, P. E., & Gibson, C. B. (2004). The impact of team empowerment on virtual team performance: The moderating role of face-to-face interaction. *Academy of Management Journal, 47,* 175–192. doi:10.2307/20159571

Klein, K. J., Bliese, P. D., Kozlowksi, S. W. J., Dansereau, F., Gavin, M. B., Griffin, M. A., . . . Bligh, M. C. (2000). Multilevel analytical techniques: Commonalities, differences and continuing questions. In K. J. Klein & S. W. J. Kozlowski (Eds.), *Multilevel theory, research, and methods in organizations* (pp. 512–553). San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.

Kolb, D., & Putnam, L. (1992). The multiple faces of conflict in organizations. *Journal of Organizational Behavior, 13,* 311–324. doi:10.1002/job.4030130313

Kozlowski, S. W. J., & Klein, K. J. (2000). A multilevel approach in theory and research in organization: Contextual, temporal and emergent processes. In K. J. Klein & S. W. J. Kozlowski (Eds.), *Multilevel theory, research, and methods in organizations: Foundations, extensions, and new directions* (pp. 3–90). San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.

Kruglanski, A. W., Pierro, A., Mannetti, L., & De Grada, E. (2006). Groups as epistemic providers: Need for closure and the unfolding of group centrism. *Psychological Review, 113,* 84–100. doi:10.1037/0033-295X.113.1.84

Kruglanski, A. W., & Webster, D. M. (1996). Motivated closing of the mind: "Seizing" and "freezing". *Psychological Review, 103,* 263–283. doi:10.1037/0033-295X.103.2.263

Lance, C. E., Dawson, B., Birkelbach, D., & Hoffman, B. J. (2010). Method effects, measurement error and substantive conclusions. *Organizational Research Methods, 13,* 435–455. doi:10.1177/1094428109352528

Leung, K., & Brew, F. P. (2009). A cultural analysis of harmony and conflict: Towards an integrated model of conflict styles. In R. S. Wyer, C.-Y. Chiu, & Y. Y. Hong (Eds.), *Understanding culture: Theory, research and application* (pp. 411–428). New York, NY: Psychology Press.

Lewin, K., Lippitt, R., & White, R. (1939). Patterns of aggressive behavior in experimentally created "social climates". *Journal of Social Psychology, 10,* 269–299. doi:10.1080/00224545.1939.9713366

Lovelace, K., Shapiro, D. L., & Weingart, L. R. (2001). Maximizing cross-functional new product teams' innovativeness and constraint adherence: A conflict communications perspective. *Academy of Management Journal, 44,* 779–793. doi:10.2307/3069415

Martin, J. (1992). *Cultures in organizations: Three perspectives*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

Martin, J., & Meyerson, D. (1998). Women and power: Conformity, resistance, and disorganized coaction. In R. Kramer & M. Neale (Eds.), *Power and influence in organizations* (pp. 311–348). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Maslach, C., & Jackson, S. E. (1981). The measurement of experienced burnout. *Journal of Occupational Behavior, 2,* 99–113. doi:10.1002/job.4030020205

Mayer, D., Nishii, L., Schneider, B., & Goldstein, H. (2007). The precursors and products of justice climates: Group leader antecedents and employee attitudinal consequences. *Personnel Psychology, 60,* 929–963. doi:10.1111/j.1744-6570.2007.00096.x

Morill, C. (1995). *The executive way: Conflict management in corporations*. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press.

Nunnally, K. (1978). *Psychometric theory*. New York, NY: McGraw-Hill.

O'Reilly, C., & Chatman, J. (1996). Culture as social control: Corporations, cults and commitment. *Research in Organizational Behavior, 18,* 157–200.

Packard, D. (1995). *The HP way: How Bill Hewlett and I built our company*. New York, NY: HarperCollins.

Perlow, L. (2003). *When you say yes but mean no: How silencing conflict wrecks relationships and companies*. New York, NY: Crown Business.

Podsakoff, P. M., MacKenzie, S. B., Lee, J.-Y., & Podsakoff, N. P. (2003). Common method bias in behavioral research: A critical review of the literature and recommended remedies. *Journal of Applied Psychology, 88,* 879–903. doi:10.1037/0021-9010.88.5.879

Pruitt, D. G., & Rubin, J. Z. (1986). *Social conflict: Escalation, stalemate, and settlement*. New York, NY: Random House.

Rahim, A., & Magner, N. R. (1995). Confirmatory factor analysis of the styles of handling interpersonal conflict: First-order factor model and its invariance across groups. *Journal of Applied Psychology, 80,* 122–132. doi:10.1037/0021-9010.80.1.122

Rahim, M. A. (1983). A measure of styles of handling interpersonal conflict. *Academy of Management Journal, 26,* 368–376. doi:10.2307/255985

Roberson, M. A., & Colquitt, J. A. (2005). Shared and configural justice: A social network model of justice in teams. *Academy of Management Review, 30,* 595–607. doi:10.5465/AMR.2005.17293715

Salancik, G. R., & Pfeffer, G. (1978). A social information processing approach to job attributes and task design. *Administrative Science Quarterly, 23,* 224–253. doi:10.2307/2392563

Schein, E. H. (1983). The role of the founder in creating organizational culture. *Organizational Dynamics, 12,* 13–28. doi:10.1016/0090-2616(83)90023-2

Schein, E. H. (1992). *Organizational culture and leadership: A dynamic view*. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.

Schein, E. H. (2003). *DEC is dead, long live DEC: The lasting legacy of digital equipment corporation*. San Francisco, CA: Berrett-Koehler Publishers.

Schneider, B. (1987). The people make the place. *Personnel Psychology, 40,* 437–453. doi:10.1111/j.1744-6570.1987.tb00609.x

Schneider, B., Ehrhart, M. G., & Macey, W. H. (2011). Organizational climate research: Achievements and the road ahead. In N. M. Ashkanasy, C. P. M. Wilderom, & M. F. Peterson (Eds.), *The handbook of organizational culture and climate* (2nd ed., pp. 29–49). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Schneider, B., Ehrhart, M. G., Mayer, D. M., Saltz, J. L., & Niles-Jolly, K. (2005). Understanding organization customer links in service settings. *Academy of Management Journal, 48,* 1017–1032. doi:10.5465/AMJ.2005.19573107

Schneider, B., Salvaggio, A. N., & Subirats, M. (2002). Service climate: A new direction for climate research. *Journal of Applied Psychology, 87,* 220–229.

Schneider, B., White, S. S., & Paul, M. C. (1998). Linking service climate and customer perceptions of service quality: Tests of a causal model. *Journal of Applied Psychology, 83,* 150–163. doi:10.1037/0021-9010.83.3.462

Schulte, M., Ostroff, C., Shmulyian, S., & Kinicki, A. (2009). Organizational climate configurations: Relationship to collective attitudes, customer satisfaction, and financial performance. *Journal of Applied Psychology, 94,* 618–634. doi:10.1037/a0014365

Schwartz, S. (1994). Are there universal aspects in the structure and contents of human values? *Journal of Social Issues, 50,* 19–45. doi:10.1111/j.1540-4560.1994.tb01196.x

Sheehy, G. (2008, August). Hillaryland at war. *Vanity Fair*. Retrieved from http://www.vanityfair.com/politics/features/2008/08/clinton200808

Siemsen, E., Roth, A., & Oliveira, P. (2010). Common method bias in regression models with linear, quadratic, and interaction effects. *Organization Research Methods, 13,* 456–476. doi:10.1177/1094428109351241

Simons, T. L., & Peterson, R. S. (2000). Task conflict and relationship conflict in top management teams: The pivotal role of intragroup trust. *Journal of Applied Psychology, 85,* 102–111. doi:10.1037/0021-9010.85.1.102

Slaikeu, K. A., & Hasson, R. H. (1998). *Controlling the cost of conflict: How to design a system for your organization*. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.

Smeesters, D., Warlop, L., Van Avermaet, E., Corneille, O., & Yzerbyt, V. (2003). Do not prime hawks with doves: The interplay of construct activation and consistency of social value orientation on cooperative behavior. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 84,* 972–987. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.84.5.972

Spector, P. E. (1987). Method variance as an artifact in self-reported affect and perceptions at work: Myth or significant problem? *Journal of Applied Psychology, 72,* 438–443. doi:10.1037/0021-9010.72.3.438

Spector, P. E. (2006). Method variance in organizational research. *Organizational Research Methods, 9,* 221–232. doi:10.1177/1094428105284955

Steinel, W., De Dreu, C. K. W., Ouwehand, E., & Ramirez-Marin, J. Y. (2009). When constituencies speak in multiple tongues: The relative persuasiveness of hawkish minorities in representative negotiation. *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 109,* 67–78. doi:10.1016/j.obhdp.2008.12.002

Taggar, S. (2002). Individual creativity and group ability to utilize individual creative resources: A multilevel model. *Academy of Management Journal, 45,* 315–330. doi:10.2307/3069349

Ten Velden, F. S., Beersma, B., & De Dreu, C. K. W. (2007). Majority and minority influence in group negotiation: The moderating effects of social motivation and decision rules. *Journal of Applied Psychology, 92,* 259–268. doi:10.1037/0021-9010.92.1.259

Thomas, K. W. (1976). Conflict and conflict management. In M. D. Dunnette (Ed.), *Handbook of industrial and organizational psychology* (pp. 889–935). Chicago, IL: Rand McNally.

Tice, H., & Morand, D. (1991). Organizational subculture and countercultures. In G. Miller (Ed.), *Studies in organizational sociology* (pp. 45–69). Greenwich, CT: JAI Press.

Tjosvold, D. (1998). Cooperative and competitive goal approach to conflict: Accomplishments and challenges. *Applied Psychology, 47,* 285–313. doi:10.1111/j.1464-0597.1998.tb00025.x

Triandis, H. C., & Gelfand, M. J. (1998). Converging measurement of horizontal and vertical individualism and collectivism. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 74,* 118–128. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.74.1.118

Tumulty, K. (2008, June 5). How Obama did it. *Time*. Retrieved from http://www.time.com/time/politics/article/0,8599,1811857,00.html

Ury, W. L., Brett, J. M., & Goldberg, S. B. (1988). *Getting disputes resolved: Designing systems to cut the costs of conflict*. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.

Van de Vliert, E. (1997). *Complex interpersonal conflict behavior*. New York, NY: Psychology Press.

Van de Vliert, E., & Kabanoff, B. (1990). Toward theory-based measures of conflict management. *Academy of Management Journal, 33,* 199–209. doi:10.2307/256359

Van de Walle, D. (1997). Development and validation of a work domain goal orientation instrument. *Educational and Psychological Measurement, 57,* 995–1015. doi:10.1177/0013164497057006009

Van Dyck, C., Frese, M., Baer, M., & Sonnentag, S. (2005). Organizational error management culture and its impact on performance: A two-study replication. *Journal of Applied Psychology, 90,* 1228–1240. doi:10.1037/0021-9010.90.6.1228

Van Lange, P. A. M. (1992). Confidence in expectations: A test of the triangle hypothesis. *European Journal of Personality, 6,* 371–379. doi:10.1002/per.2410060505

Walton, R. E., Dutton, J. M., & Cafferty, T. P. (1969). Organizational context and interdepartmental conflict. *Administrative Science Quarterly, 14,* 522–542. doi:10.2307/2391590

Weingart, L. R., Brett, J. M., Olekalns, M., & Smith, P. L. (2007). Conflicting social motives in negotiating groups. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 93,* 994–1010.

Weingart, L., & Olekalns, M. (2004). Communication processes in negotiation. In M. Gelfand & J. Brett (Eds.), *Handbook of negotiation and culture* (pp. 143–157). Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press.

Zohar, D. (2002). The effects of leadership dimensions, safety climate, and assigned priorities on minor injuries in work groups. *Journal of Organizational Behavior, 23,* 75–92. doi:10.1002/job.130

Appendix A

Conflict Cultures Scale

Instructions: Please read each statement carefully and circle the number that best reflects your opinion (1 = Strongly disagree to 5 = Strongly agree). When conflict arises in this branch . . .

Item	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3
1. Branch members examine issues until we find a solution that satisfies everyone. [collaborative]	**.86**	−.25	−.08
2. Branch members examine ideas from all sides to find a mutually optimal solution. [collaborative]	**.83**	−.28	−.09
3. Branch members work out a solution that serves everyone's interests. [collaborative]	**.62**	−.38	−.18
4. Branch members try to come up with creative solutions that incorporate multiple perspectives. [collaborative]	**.56**	−.34	−.19
5. Branch members push their own points of view. [dominating]	−.22	**.46**	−.11
6. Branch members each search for gains for only themselves. [dominating]	−.37	**.67**	.09
7. Branch members fight for what they want personally. [dominating]	−.10	**.57**	.04
8. Branch members do everything to win for themselves. [dominating]	−.20	**.68**	.15
9. Branch members try to force others to accept their own points of view. [dominating]	−.27	**.66**	.12
10. Branch members discuss conflict in the open. [avoidant, reverse scored]	−.15	−.05	**.63**
11. Branch members avoid openly discussing conflicts. [avoidant]	.08	.00	**.64**
12. Branch members are very reluctant to openly talk about conflict. [avoidant]	−.06	.20	**.41**
13. Conflict is dealt with openly in this branch. [avoidant, reverse scored]	−.26	.06	**.60**

Note. Table values are factor loadings that resulted from an exploratory factor analysis with maximum likelihood estimation and varimax rotation. Factor loadings above .40 are in bold.

(*Appendices continue*)

Appendix B

Leader Conflict Behaviors Scale

Instructions: Please read each statement carefully and circle the number that best reflects your opinion (1 = Strongly disagree to 5 = Strongly agree). When there are conflicts in the branch, my branch manager does the following:

Item	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3
1. My branch manager encourages people to resolve conflicts through a problem-solving approach. [collaborative]	**.57**	−.28	−.22
2. My branch manager treats conflicts as opportunities for learning and growth. [collaborative]	**.62**	−.04	−.22
3. My branch manager stresses that it is important to find a way for everyone to win when conflicts arise. [collaborative]	**.65**	.03	−.0
4. My branch manager encourages branch members to come up with creative solutions when conflictual issues arise. [collaborative]	**.61**	−.24	−.18
5. My branch manager allows branch members to argue until someone wins. [dominating]	−.14	**.65**	.13
6. My branch manager thinks it is OK when branch members push their own points of view on others. [dominating]	−.15	**.68**	.13
7. My branch manager thinks highly of people who "win" conflicts. [dominating]	.01	**.37**	.22
8. My branch manager will not discuss issues that may lead to conflict. [avoidant]	−.15	.06	**.46**
9. My branch manager cuts off discussion as soon as conflicts arise. [avoidant]	−.13	.13	**.51**
10. My branch manager does not get involved in employees' conflicts. [avoidant]	−.12	.22	**.72**
11. My branch manager avoids getting involved in managing conflicts in the branch. [avoidant]	−.32	.33	**.57**

Note. Table values are factor loadings that resulted from an exploratory factor analysis with maximum likelihood estimation and varimax rotation. Factor loadings above .40 are in bold.

Received March 20, 2010
Revision received July 2, 2012
Accepted July 9, 2012 ■