

Individualism–Collectivism and Accountability in Intergroup Negotiations

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This research incorporates the theory of individualism–collectivism into research on accountability in intergroup negotiations. Given that accountability is fundamentally a norm enforcement mechanism and that norms and standards for behavior vary for individualists and collectivists (H. R. Markus & S. Kitayama, 1991; H. C. Triandis, 1995) it was predicted that accountability would differentially affect individualists and collectivists in intergroup negotiations. In support of this, results from a laboratory study (with Caucasians and Asian Americans) and from a judgment study (in the United States and Estonia) found that collectivism moderated the effects of accountability on negotiators' psychological states, behaviors, and outcomes. In contrast to previous research, the results illustrate that accountability does not necessarily produce competitive behavior, but rather produces the behavior most normative for individuals in their sociocultural experience.

At no time in our history has it been more important to understand how elements of culture affect negotiations. Today, negotiations take place between heads of state, diplomats, and within numerous international organizations in unprecedented numbers. Undoubtedly, negotiation is now regarded as one of the major functions of diplomacy, focusing on issues ranging from disarmament to international hijacking (Druckman & Mahoney, 1977). Furthermore, as world trade and global economic activity have grown exponentially, many organizations have become primarily international in their strategy, structure, markets, and resource bases (Adler, 1991). These transitions have increased the frequency of negotiations between people of different cultures. And, as a result of these trends, the topic of culture and negotiation has become popular in politics (Fisher, 1980) as well as in business (Harris & Moran, 1979).

While practical concerns about cultural influences on negotiation have had a long past, systematic theory and research on the subject have a short history (Gelfand & Dyer, *in press*). The dominant paradigms in behavioral

negotiation research (Bazerman & Neale, 1986; Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993; Thompson, 1990) have virtually ignored elements of culture (*cf.* Gray, 1994), and there is an implicit assumption that theories about negotiation apply universally. However, universal laws are only logically tenable if variables are derived from biological factors common to all human beings, common ecological pressures, or exposure to the same fundamental social structure (Pepitone & Triandis, 1987). Since behavioral theories of interpersonal negotiation do not normally include concepts derived from those origins, there is a need to explicitly address whether our theories are universal, or are affected by elements of culture. Furthermore, as argued below, conditions in negotiation which activate norms and standards for behavior, such as accountability (Carnevale, 1985; Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993), are particularly likely to be affected by elements of culture, and as such, warrant empirical attention.

Purpose of This Research

The purpose of this research is to examine whether effects of accountability in negotiation are universal, or are dependent on elements of negotiators' sociocultural experience. Accountability is the extent to which representatives are required to justify their actions, and are going to be evaluated and rewarded by their constituents (Carnevale, 1985). Research on this phenomenon, which has been conducted over the past two decades, has consistently demonstrated that accountability produces competition, and reduces the effectiveness of representatives in intergroup negotiations (Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993). However, to date, theory and research on accountability has been primarily developed and tested with Western samples which represent

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We extend our gratitude to Paul Hanges, Katherine Klein, Ben Schneider, and Harry Triandis for their helpful comments on earlier versions of this article and to Carrie Souter for assistance in the data collection.

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roughly 27% of humankind (Triandis, 1994a). Given that recent research has illuminated important differences between these samples and others, most notably on individualism–collectivism (Hofstede, 1980; Schwartz, 1994; Triandis, 1995), it is important to examine whether our understanding of accountability in negotiation is laden with such cultural elements.

Theoretically speaking, given the fact that accountability is fundamentally a norm enforcement mechanism (Tetlock, 1992), and that norms and standards for behavior vary for individualists and collectivists (Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Triandis, 1989, 1995), it was expected that accountability would differentially affect individualists and collectivists in intergroup negotiations. In other words, in the article, we will argue that accountability does not necessarily produce competition in intergroup negotiations, as has been consistently found in previous research, but rather produces the behavior which is most normative for individuals in their sociocultural experience.

In what follows, we first review research on the effects of accountability in intergroup negotiations. Next, we discuss the element of culture relevant to our purposes, individualism–collectivism, and its potential role in accountable negotiations. On the basis of this discussion, two studies will be described which examined the notion that collectivism would moderate the effects of accountability on representatives' psychological states, behaviors, and outcomes in intergroup negotiations.

Intergroup Negotiation

Negotiation is the process by which two or more parties attempt to resolve a perceived divergence of interest in order to avoid social conflict (Carnevale & Pruitt, 1992). Parties in negotiations situations often consist of groups of people who are attempting to reach agreement (Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993). In these situations, groups often rely on individual agents to represent their interests, and to conduct transactions that affect the group's welfare (Rubin & Sander, 1988). For instance, in a business context, negotiations often take place between representatives of different committees, departments, and even organizations. In an international context, negotiations take place between diplomats and spokespersons, who represent different nations.

Whereas early research on group representation relied mainly on case studies of negotiations in industrial relations (Walton & McKersie, 1965), subsequently models of negotiation evolved that attempted to describe the particular circumstances faced by group representatives (Adams, 1976; McGrath, 1966). Perhaps most influential in this regard is Adams's (1976) boundary role model of group representation, which is based on role conflict in organizational settings, and on the notion that representatives must take on specialized boundary roles to deal with people

inside and outside the organization. For instance, marketing and sales agents, personnel recruiters, and company negotiators all work within the organization, but also work as external agents on behalf of the organization, and thus are often subject to influence attempts from both their constituents and their counterparts outside of the organization.

Adams's (1976) boundary role model has served as a catalyst of two decades of research focused on understanding and predicting the behavior of representatives in intergroup negotiations (Holmes, Ellard, & Lamm, 1986). This effort has concentrated on the most basic processes identified by Adams (1976), namely on how representatives respond to constituent pressures in intergroup negotiations. In this regard, much research has focused on explicit pressures, such as the effects of accountability to one's constituents, on representatives' psychological states, behaviors, and outcomes in intergroup negotiations (Carnevale, 1985). The basic question investigated in this line of inquiry is whether representatives respond to accountability pressures by engaging in competitive behavior, and forego more adaptive solutions which would reduce intergroup conflict. Below, the nature and effects of accountability will be detailed to answer this question.

Accountability Effects in Negotiation

Broadly construed, accountability is "the condition of being answerable for conducting oneself in a manner that is consistent with relevant prescriptions for how things should be" (Schlenker & Weingold, 1989, p. 24). When such conditions exist, images of standards and expectations of an audience are made salient for one's behavior, and in anticipation of being judged, individuals will attempt to match their behavior to those standards (Schlenker, 1986; Schlenker & Weingold, 1989). In this respect, accountability is tied to an individual's identity, as it activates images that the individual aspires to project in a particular situation to gain approval from audiences (Schlenker & Weingold, 1989).

In a negotiation context, accountability is typically activated when representatives are required to justify their actions after the negotiation, when they are going to be evaluated, or when their rewards or punishments are in their constituent's control (Carnevale, 1985). For example, constituents often have control over such "formal rewards" as job status, promotions, and monetary payment, as well as control over "informal rewards," such as social recognition and status (Holmes et al., 1986). Research in negotiation has indeed demonstrated that when such accountable conditions exist, representatives are particularly motivated to behave in ways which enable them to gain approval and status from constituents (Gruder & Rosen, 1971; Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993). Moreover, in pursuit of this, representatives often adopt the behaviors that are construed as socially acceptable and defensible in efforts to gain favor of constituents (Tet-

lock, 1992). For instance, Adelberg and Batson (1978) found that accountable representatives were more likely to use an allocation rule they thought would please their constituents, rather than an allocation rule that would provide the most help to their constituents.

The question that naturally arises from this discussion is: What behaviors do representatives expect constituents will find socially acceptable? Consistent with Adams's (1976) original theoretical formulations, research on effects of accountability has found that, in the absence of other information, representatives often assume that constituents prefer them to be competitive in intergroup negotiations. Gruder (1971), for example, demonstrated that representatives view their constituents as much more focused on winning the negotiation than the representatives themselves are. This notion was particularly evident in a study by Benton and Druckman (1973). In this study, negotiators either represented their own interests, or were accountable to a group that was given the power to allocate the rewards obtained in the negotiation. In the latter condition, representatives were given either cooperative instructions, competitive instructions, or no instructions. The results demonstrated that negotiators who were given no instructions negotiated in a similar fashion to those representatives who were given competitive instructions (e.g., had more competitive goals and rejected more offers).

Consistent with this early research, research on representatives' actual behaviors and outcomes during intergroup negotiation has consistently found that accountability makes bargainers more reluctant to make concessions, and enhances the use of contentious tactics, both of which make it harder to reach agreement in intergroup negotiations (see Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993). This has been found in both distributive negotiation situations, in which a gain for one party is a loss for the other (Benton, 1972; Gruder, 1971; Klimoski, 1972; Klimoski & Ash, 1974), as well as in integrative situations, in which there are a number of possible agreements with different levels of joint profit (Carnevale, Pruitt, & Seilheimer, 1981; Neale, 1984; Pruitt et al., 1978). For example, in a study of distributive bargaining, Benton (1972) found that negotiations between accountable representatives took longer to finish, involved more rejections of offers and fewer concessions, and resulted in more unequal outcomes than negotiations between representatives who were not accountable. Likewise, Carnevale et al. (1981) found that high accountability produced more contentious tactics, such as threats, positional commitments, persuasive arguments, and efforts to dominate the other party, and also produced lower outcomes in integrative negotiations, as compared to low accountability.

In sum, studies have found that accountability affects competitive processes, and results in lower outcomes in intergroup negotiations, as compared to unaccountable negotiations. In the absence of other information, representa-

tives presume that constituents want them to be competitive, and employ tactics which may be effective in pleasing their constituents, but are less effective in dealing with the conflict itself. Indeed, on the basis of the consistency of these findings, several researchers have recommended that representatives should try to escape the pressures of evaluation in order to be more effective in intergroup negotiations (Organ, 1971; Wall & Blum, 1991). Other interventions, such as developing a personal relationship with the other negotiator, have been suggested to offset the powerful, and often debilitating forces tying representatives to their group (Ben-Yoav & Pruitt, 1984; Holmes et al., 1986).

The Fly in the Ointment

Notwithstanding the theoretical and practical contributions of this line of research, it is important to recognize that it has primarily been conceptualized and tested in one particular context, the United States, with primarily Caucasian, middle class populations, and there is an implicit assumption that representatives invariably respond competitively in accountable negotiations. Below, we review culture theory which we argue will bear directly on representatives' reactions to accountability in intergroup negotiations.

Individualism-Collectivism

In a broad sense, culture consists of the socially created mechanisms through which groups enact a fit with their environments (McCusker & Gelfand, 1997). Such mechanisms run the spectrum from formal, structural elements (e.g., laws, institutions, and organizations) to informal, process elements (e.g., norms, roles, values, metaphors). Cultural mechanisms can be organized around a theme, and form what Triandis (1996) called a "syndrome." These themes often reflect basic issues and problems which societies and their members must confront (Schwartz, 1994).

One fundamental issue is the nature of the relationship between the individual and the group in the society, which has been broadly referred to as *individualism-collectivism*. This theme has also been referred to as self-emphasis and collectivity (Parsons, 1949), *Gesellschaft* and *Gemeinschaft* (Toennies, 1957), individualism and collaterality (Kluckhohn & Strodtbeck, 1961), and agency and community (Bakan, 1966). While there are subtle differences in the meanings of these terms, they all relate to a theme which contrasts the extent to which people are autonomous individuals or embedded in their groups (Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Schwartz, 1994). It is now conceived as one of the primary dimensions by which cultures and their members can be differentiated (Hofstede, 1980; Schwartz, 1994), and much research has illustrated its impact on the self, values, and norms for behavior (Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Triandis, 1989, 1995).

In particular, in individualist cultures, such as the United States, the independent self predominates (Triandis, 1989). The self is construed as separate and detached from collectives, and one's inner attributes (e.g., attitudes, preferences, abilities) are the primary units of consciousness (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). The cultural ideal is to separate, be distinctive from others, and achieve one's own goals (Shweder & Bourne, 1982), often through competition (Triandis & Gelfand, 1998). Consistent with this view of the self, in individualistic cultures, there is an emphasis on values such as autonomy, competition, freedom, independence, and achievement (Schwartz, 1994; Triandis, 1995; Triandis, McCusker, & Hui, 1990), and norms favor assertiveness and confrontation in interdependent situations (Leung, 1997; Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Triandis, 1995).

By contrast, in collectivist cultures, the self is defined in terms of relationships and the interdependent self predominates (Triandis, 1989). As Markus and Kitayama (1991) explained, "experiencing interdependence entails seeing oneself as part of an encompassing social relationship and recognizing that one's behavior is determined, contingent on, and to a large extent, organized by what the actor perceives to be the thoughts, feelings and actions of *others* in the relationship" (p. 227). Cultural ideals include maintaining relatedness and promoting others' needs and interests through cooperation (Shweder & Bourne, 1982). Likewise, there is an emphasis on values such as belongingness, preserving public image, modesty, and conformity (Schwartz, 1994; Triandis et al., 1990), and norms favor harmony and cooperation with similar others in interdependent situations among collectivists (Leung, 1997; Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Triandis, 1995).

Although this discussion presents the constructs as pure dichotomies, it is becoming increasingly clear that cultures and their members are not purely collectivist or purely individualist (Triandis, 1995). Along these lines, research has consistently illustrated that individuals within cultures vary on individualism–collectivism (Triandis, Leung, Villareal, & Clack, 1985; Schwartz, 1994; Wagner, 1995). For instance, Wagner (1995) demonstrated that within the United States, individualists were much less likely to engage in cooperative behavior in groups, as compared to collectivists. Thus, the nature of the independent and interdependent self, and the values, ideals, and norms which are cultivated among individuals, varies within as well as across cultures.

Individualism–Collectivism and Accountability

This discussion naturally raises the question of whether accountability invariably produces competition among representatives in intergroup negotiations. As reviewed previously, in accountable conditions, representatives adopt the behaviors which are construed as socially acceptable, or in

other words, are normative, in order to please their constituents. However, as discussed, norms and standards for behavior vary for individualists and collectivists, and as such, accountability is likely to activate different standards, and result in different behaviors, for individualists and collectivists in accountable negotiations. In other words, on the basis of the culture theory presented, it is expected that while accountability may be a universal phenomenon (i.e., all negotiators may encounter situations in which they are evaluated, monitored, and rewarded), the behavioral ideals and standards representatives feel compelled to meet differ for individualists and collectivists, and thus, accountability will differentially affect individualists and collectivists in intergroup negotiations. In this view, in the absence of other instructions from constituents, all representatives are expected to adopt the behaviors that are valued and are socially acceptable in determining how to behave. Yet the particular behaviors that are deemed socially acceptable, and thus enacted in accountable negotiations, will vary depending on the degree to which representatives emphasize individualism or collectivism.

More specifically, it was expected that accountability will enhance competitive processes and reduce outcomes among people who have been socialized to emphasize individualism, given that for these individuals, competition is normative in interdependent situations. Indeed, previous research in the U.S., an individualistic culture, has demonstrated that representatives expect that constituents want them to win and to act competitively in intergroup negotiations (Benton & Druckman, 1973; Gruder, 1971). However, it was expected that accountability will enhance cooperative processes and increase outcomes among people who have been socialized to emphasize collectivism, given that for these individuals, cooperation is normative in interdependent situations (especially with members of the same group). On the basis of this discussion, it was predicted that

Hypothesis 1: The effects of accountability on negotiators' psychological states (i.e., behavioral intentions and construals of opponents) will be moderated by negotiators' collectivism.

Hypothesis 2: The effects of accountability on negotiators' behaviors during the negotiation (i.e., cooperative versus competitive) will be moderated by negotiators' collectivism.

Hypothesis 3: The effects of accountability on negotiators' outcomes will be moderated by negotiators' collectivism.

Statistically speaking, we expected accountability would interact with negotiators' collectivism to predict psychological states, behaviors, and outcomes, such that negotiators with high levels of collectivism would have more cooperative psychological states, would engage in more cooperative behaviors, and would achieve higher outcomes in accountable negotiations, as compared to negotiators with low levels of collectivism.

Overview of Current Research

Two studies, a laboratory experiment and a judgment study, examined the possibility that collectivism would moderate the effects of accountability in intergroup negotiations. In Study 1, Caucasian and Asian American students in the U.S. participated in a laboratory experiment of integrative bargaining, in which representatives were either in high or low accountability conditions. Given that laboratory experiments are difficult to conduct across cultures (Triandis, 1983), and the variable of interest was negotiators' collectivism, a within-country laboratory experiment was preferred. In order to maximize variation on the variable of interest, Asian and Caucasian Americans were included in the study, as the former group has been found to be more collectivist (Rhee, Uleman, & Lee, 1996; Triandis, et al., 1986). To replicate the results with a different sample and method, we conducted Study 2, in which students responded to a scenario which depicted negotiations between representatives who were in high or low accountability conditions. In order to maximize variation on collectivism, U.S. and Estonian students were included, the latter of whom have been found to be more collectivistic (Schwartz, 1994). Consistent with previous studies (e.g., Wagner, 1995), in both studies, the explanatory variable of interest, negotiators' collectivism, was measured with existing measures (Triandis, 1994b), and was used as the predictor of responses in high and low accountability negotiations.

Study 1

Method

Participants. One-hundred two participants from a large Midwestern university participated in the experiment (47% female, 53% male). Sixty-six students were self-identified Caucasian students, of either North, West, or East European background. Thirty-six students were self-identified as Asian American, of either North, East, or South Asian backgrounds. The average age of participants was 19.4. All participants were volunteers and received credit toward a course requirement for their participation.

Experimental design. All participants were first randomly assigned to negotiation teams, and then were randomly assigned to one of two negotiation conditions: high versus low accountability. All negotiation teams, as well as the actual negotiations, consisted of participants of the same ethnic background, of the same gender, and of the same negotiation condition.¹

Procedure. All two-person groups were randomly assigned to their role in the negotiation, which was either buying or selling advertising (for "The Gallery" and "NDC Printing," respectively). Each team met in separate rooms for 10 min, at which time they were given a tag which specified the group's name, and were asked to get acquainted. Subsequently, the two-person groups were separated and were brought to separate rooms. They were then told that they would receive instruction about the role they would assume during the negotiation (either the representative or the manager). In fact, each participant was told they would be repre-

sented their other group member (the "manager") in negotiations with another representative over the terms of an advertisement. Each participant was then given a packet containing a profile of the situation, a negotiation issue chart (see below) and quiz, a prize description, information about their manager (manipulation discussed below), procedures, and a reminder list.

Negotiation task. The study utilized a modified version of a task that has been used in previous research on integrative bargaining (Pruitt, 1981). The terms of the negotiation involved the following four issues: (a) the amount of discount off of the price for the advertisement; (b) the number of colors in the advertisement; (c) the amount of time until the bill for the advertisement must be paid; and (d) how many people would receive the advertisement.

For each of these issues, there were five alternatives that the negotiators could settle on. Furthermore, each proposal had a certain number of "points" that represented the value of the proposal to the negotiator, which was depicted in an issue chart that each participant was given. As depicted in Appendix A, the negotiators had different point values assigned to identical proposals. Both the discount and the color issues were distributive in nature, in that the issues had the same priority for the negotiators (e.g., both enabled the negotiator to earn the same number of points), and the point values for these issues were reversed. In this respect, one negotiator's loss on each of these issues was the other negotiator's gain. By contrast, the billing issue and the circulation issue were integrative in nature, in that the point values were reversed for each negotiator, yet the issues did not have the same priority for each negotiator. As can be seen, an agreement in which the negotiators completely traded off on their low-priority issues would involve an agreement based on 10% discount, 2 colors, 1 week, and 500,000 circulation. This latter agreement, which is arguably optimal, provides both negotiators with 6,200 points.

All participants were instructed that an agreement would be reached only when both negotiators agreed to the same levels on all four issues. Additionally, they were told that they were allowed to discuss anything during the negotiation, including the points in the issue chart, but were not allowed to physically show their issue charts to their counterparts. As in other studies on negotiation, in order to simulate what occurs in real-world negotiations, participants were told that the profits earned in the negotiation would be converted into lottery tickets after the negotiation, and that the more points they earned in the negotiation, the better their chance to win monetary prizes.

Manipulation of accountability. Following previous research (Breaugh & Klimoski, 1977; Carnevale et al., 1981), accountability had three components: constituent control over rewards, justification of performance, and evaluation of the representative by his or her constituent. In the high accountability condition, the representatives were told (in their information packet): "You will go alone to negotiate with the other representative. After you are done negotiating, you will have to write a one-page essay *explaining*

¹ In the low-accountability condition, there were 12 male pairs and 16 female pairs (of these, 18 were Caucasian and 10 were Asian). In the high-accountability condition, there were 15 male pairs and 8 female pairs (of these, 15 were Caucasian and 8 were Asian).

[illegible]

Results and Discussion

Consistent with previous research, the hypotheses were tested using the dyad as the level of analysis. Conceptually, negotiation is an interdependent activity and thus, the responses that individuals make are likely to be dependent on their counterpart's responses. Statistically, there is correlated error among respondents, and thus, the dyadic level of analysis is more appropriate than the individual level. Accordingly, all individual items were averaged within dyads. Consistent with our theory and hypotheses, and following Wagner (1995) and others (Chan, 1992; Earley, 1989, 1993), the analyses used negotiators' scores on collectivism as the indicator of the relevant aspect of culture (i.e., the independent variable), rather than ethnicity.² In particular, the hypotheses were tested using hierarchical regression analysis with dummy coding to utilize the full range of the collectivism scale. And, as per Cohen and Cohen (1983), the hypotheses were tested by examining the significance of the ΔR^2 for the interaction between collectivism and accountability, after controlling for both main effects, which were entered on steps one and two of the regression.

Manipulation checks. Multiple regression analysis revealed a main effect for accountability ($\beta = .72$, $t = 6.95$), indicating that high accountability dyads felt more accountable as compared to low-accountability dyads ($p < .001$) ($M_{\text{high}} = 20.3$; $M_{\text{low}} = 14.6$). There were no other significant effects for this variable.

In support of Hypothesis 1, Table 2 demonstrates that there was a significant interaction between accountability and collectivism on behavioral intentions to concede ($p < .05$). Figure 1 illustrates the nature of this interaction with the regression plots. As illustrated, intentions to concede were positively associated with dyads' collectivism in high-accountability negotiations. In other words, in high-accountability negotiations, the more collectivist the dyad, the more willingness there was to concede in the upcoming negotiation (and conversely, the less collectivist the dyad, the less willingness there was to concede in the upcoming negotiation). Interestingly, the opposite pattern emerged in low accountability negotiations. As can be seen in Figure 1, in low-accountability negotiations, intentions to concede were negatively associated with dyads' collectivism. In this respect, in low-accountability negotiations, the less collectivist the dyad, the more willingness there was to concede (and conversely, the more collectivist the dyad, the less willingness there was to concede). Thus, high- and low-accountability negotiations differentially affected intentions to concede, depending on dyads' level of collectivism.

Table 2 illustrates that there was a significant interaction between collectivism and accountability on *cooperative behavior* during the negotiation, ($p < .05$), supportive of Hypothesis 2. Figure 2 illustrates that in high-accountability negotiations, cooperative behavior was positively associ-

ated with dyads' collectivism. In other words, in high-accountability negotiations, the more collectivist the dyad, the more cooperative behavior was reported (and conversely, the less collectivist the dyad, the less cooperative behavior was reported). Yet in low accountability negotiations, collectivism was negatively associated with cooperative behavior. That is, the less collectivist the dyad, the more cooperative behavior was reported (and conversely, the more collectivist the dyad, the less cooperative behavior was reported). Put differently, cooperative behavior was enhanced in highly accountable negotiations the more dyads emphasized collectivism, yet was enhanced in low accountability negotiations the more dyads de-emphasized collectivism.

Table 2 illustrates that there was a significant interaction between collectivism and accountability on negotiation outcomes ($p < .05$), providing support for Hypothesis 3. The nature of this interaction was similar to those described previously. As depicted in Figure 3, profit was positively associated with dyads' collectivism in high accountability negotiations. In high-accountability negotiations, the more collectivist the dyad, the higher the profit achieved (and conversely, the less collectivist the dyad, the lower the profit achieved). On the other hand, collectivism was negatively associated with profit in low accountability negotiations. In this respect, in low-accountability negotiations, the less collectivist the dyad, the higher the profit achieved (and conversely, the more collectivist the dyad, the lower the profit achieved).

Finally, we also examined perceptions that negotiators had of their opponents after the negotiation. Table 2 illustrates a marginal interaction for collectivism and accountability on positive impressions ($p > .06$). The pattern for this variable was identical to those described above: Positive impressions were positively associated with dyads' collectivism in high accountability negotiations, yet negatively associated with dyads' collectivism in low accountability negotiations. Thus, high and low accountability differentially affected perceptions of one's opponent, depending on dyads' level of collectivism.

Summary. Consistent with the hypotheses, the effects of accountability on negotiators' psychological states (behavioral intentions, construals of one's opponent), behaviors, and outcomes were moderated by negotiators' collectivism. Given that interactions are difficult to replicate (Amir & Sharon, 1988), Study 2 was designed to discern whether these patterns would be found using a different method and a different sample. Toward this end, we examined the effects of accountability in a judgment study with Cauca-

² Consistent with previous research, the results did demonstrate that Asian Americans were more collectivist than Caucasians, $F(1, 48) = 11.75$, $p < .001$ ($M_{\text{Asian}} = 7.0$; $M_{\text{Cauc}} = 6.4$).

Table 2
Hierarchical Regression Analysis in Study 1 and Study 2

Step	Behavioral intentions ^a			Cooperative behavior ^a			Positive impressions ^a			Negotiation outcomes ^a			Negotiation construals ^b		
	ΔR^2	F	β	ΔR^2	F	β	ΔR^2	F	β	ΔR^2	F	β	ΔR^2	F	β
1. Collectivism	.01	.48	-.10	.03	1.59	-.18	.01	.22	-.08	.01	.55	-.11	.03	2.60	.17
2. Accountability	.001	.08	.04	.01	.33	-.08	.00	.02	-.02	.08*	3.99*	-.28*	.01	1.22	-.12
3. Interaction	.16*	8.56*	5.28*	.09*	5.10*	4.13*	.08†	3.10†	3.74†	.09*	4.61*	4.27*	.05*	4.09*	.31*

^a Study 1 measures. ^b Study 2 measures.

* $p < .05$. † $p > .06$.

sians and Estonians. As this methodology is best suited to examining perceptions and not behavior, we expected an interaction between collectivism and accountability on construals of the negotiation situation. Thus:

Hypothesis 4: The effects of accountability on representatives' construals of the negotiation situation (i.e., cooperative or competitive) will be moderated by collectivism.

Study 2

Method

Participants. One-hundred nine students participated in the study (62% female, 38% male). Sixty-six students were from a large Midwestern University, and forty-three students were from a large university in Estonia. The average age of the participants was 19.8. All participants were volunteers and received credit toward a course requirement for their participation.

Experimental design and procedure. All participants were randomly assigned to either high-accountability or low-accountability negotiations.³ Students were told that they would be involved in a simulation of a negotiation, which is based on real life situations. They were asked to take their role seriously, and respond how they really would behave if faced with a similar situation.

The scenario was modeled after the negotiation task used in Study 1. All participants were given the role of a representative of a company interested in buying advertising. They were told that they have been working for a store that sells paintings (the Gallery in the United States, the *Galerii* in Estonia), which was relocating to another city. Each was told that the Gallery may hire another company, NDC Printing (*Ruut* in Estonia), to place an advertisement for a final sale, and was further told that they have been representing the store in transactions with the company for years, and would be negotiating with a representative from NDC over the advertisement that day.

Accountability manipulation. As in Study 1, a three-part manipulation was used in this study (evaluation, justification, compensation). Low-accountability participants were told: "Today, you are going to meet Jones for the first time to attempt to negotiate the terms of the ad. As in the many negotiation dealings you have had in the past, and as dictated by company policy, you will go alone to the negotiation. Because you have worked for many years at the Gallery, you will have *complete authority* for making decisions when you go and meet with Jones, and will not have to justify what you decide to the manager. Also, as in the past, you will not be evaluated based on your agreement."

High-accountability participants were told: "Today, you are going to meet Jones for the first time to attempt to negotiate the terms of the ad. As in your recent negotiation dealings and along with company policy, you will go alone to the negotiation, but will

³ In the low-accountability condition, there were 17 males and 40 females (of these, 33 were from the United States and 24 from Estonia). In the high-accountability condition, there were 19 males and 33 females (of these, 33 were from the U.S. and 19 from Estonia).




Figure 1. Interaction of collectivism and accountability on negotiators' behavioral intentions.

have to justify what you do right after the negotiation to your manager. Also, as in the past, you will be evaluated by the manager afterwards. These evaluations are important to you because they are used to determine your salary."

Participants were told they would have to negotiate over four issues, and were given an issue chart with the point values and levels for each issue, all of which were similar to Study 1.

Experimental measures. Measures assessed the manipulations, the construals participants had of the situation, and collectivism. Manipulation checks were assessed with the same three items as in Study 1 (evaluation, scrutiny, and justification; Cronbach's $\alpha = .84$) and responses to the three items were averaged. To assess construals of the negotiation situation, all participants were asked to rate how they thought the negotiation situation would be on a scale from 1–9 along these continua: smooth–frustrating; cooperative–competitive; pleasant–unpleasant; good–bad; calm–violent. The responses were highly interrelated (Cronbach's $\alpha = .81$), and were averaged (responses were recoded such that higher scores indicated cooperative construals). Finally, collectivism was measured through responses to the same 16 INDCOL attitude items used in Study 1 (Cronbach's $\alpha = .73$).

All descriptive statistics are presented in Table 1. Materials were translated into Estonian and back translated into English to check for discrepancies. Given that the measures were in different languages, all measures were standardized within subject to eliminate possible response sets (Triandis, 1983).

Results and Discussion

As per Study 1, hierarchical regression analysis with dummy coding was used to test the hypothesis that collectivism and accountability would interact in predicting construals of negotiation situations.⁴ The manipulation check was successful ($p < .0001$; $\beta = .73$, $t = 9.7$), and indicated that high-accountability representatives perceived they were more accountable than low-accountability representatives.

Table 2 illustrates the results of the hierarchical regression analysis on construals of the negotiation. As indicated, there was a significant interaction between collectivism and accountability which accounted for significant variance in the dependent measure ($p < .05$), in support of Hypothesis 4. Consistent with previous results, cooperative construals

⁴ Interestingly, there were no differences between Estonians and Americans on collectivism ($p > .30$). This result echoes very recent findings of a study comparing American, Estonian, and Russian students (Realo & Allik, in press). Both results most likely reflect that Estonia has gone through significant changes since Schwartz (1994). Nevertheless, there was sufficient variability on negotiators' collectivism to test the hypothesis of interest regarding the interaction of accountability and negotiator collectivism on construals of negotiation situations.




Figure 2. Interaction of collectivism and accountability on negotiators' behaviors.

als of the situation were positively associated with negotiators' collectivism in high accountability negotiations. In other words, in high-accountability conditions, the more collectivist the negotiator, the more the situation was construed cooperatively (and conversely, the less collectivist the negotiator, the less the situation was construed cooperatively). Similar to previous results, the opposite pattern emerged in low accountability negotiations.

General Discussion

The purpose of this research was to examine whether accountability invariably produces competition among representatives in intergroup negotiations. Consistent with predictions, two studies demonstrated that accountability had differential effects on negotiators' psychological states, behaviors, and outcomes, depending on negotiators' collectivism.

Specifically, high accountability enhanced competition for representatives with low levels of collectivism, yet enhanced cooperation for those with high levels of collectivism. Compared to representatives with high levels of collectivism, representatives with low levels of collectivism had more competitive behavioral intentions and construals prior to negotiations, engaged in less cooperative behavior

during negotiations, and perceived their opponents more negatively in high-accountability conditions. On the basis of these patterns, it is not surprising that in high-accountability conditions, representatives with low levels of collectivism achieved lower outcomes, as compared to those with high levels of collectivism. Thus, unlike previous research which demonstrated that accountability produces competition in intergroup negotiation, these results suggest that accountability may have a *positive* effect on some negotiators, and that reactions to accountability depend on negotiators' collectivism.

More generally, the results suggest that in accountable situations, representatives may adopt the schema and behavior that is normative in their cultural experience when they are going to be evaluated. That is, for people who deemphasize collectivism, competition is normative, and thus, more likely to ensure positive evaluations in accountable negotiations. Indeed, this is consistent with much previous research on accountability in intergroup negotiation, which has primarily been conducted in the U.S. However, for those who place a high emphasis on collectivism, cooperative behavior and harmony with others, especially with persons with whom one is similar, is normative and is likely to ensure positive evaluations in accountable negotiations.




Figure 3. Interaction of collectivism and accountability on negotiators' outcomes.

This is consistent with the results of this study, which was conducted with targets with whom participants shared either ethnicity or nationality (i.e., were part of the same group).

An interesting prediction for future research is that the ingroup-outgroup status of one's opponent will moderate this effect, since this distinction has been found to be important among collectivists (Triandis, 1995). Perhaps when collectivists are negotiating with outgroups, norms will favor competition, and representatives will respond accordingly in accountable situations. If so, then accountability may precipitate either competition or cooperation in intergroup negotiations for collectivists, depending on the situation. Among individualists, however, ingroup-outgroup distinctions are not as salient, and as such, would not be expected to alter representatives' responses to accountability. In testing such propositions, it may be useful to incorporate the design used by Benton and Druckman (1974) into the study of collectivism and accountability. This may involve, for example, giving accountable representatives either competitive, cooperative, or no instructions, and then having them interact with either ingroups or outgroup negotiators. In this respect, one can examine if the behavior of representatives in the no instruction condition is

similar to representatives' behavior in the cooperative or competitive instruction conditions, and whether this varies by collectivism and relationship with the opponent.⁵

Although the previous discussion focused primarily on cognitions, behaviors, and outcomes in high-accountability situations, it is equally important to note the patterns of behavior in low-accountability situations, when in effect, representatives are *released from pressures to do what is expected*. In particular, this research suggests somewhat of a reversal of normative behavior for the respective representatives: In the low-accountability condition, those who had high levels of collectivism reported less cooperative intentions and behavior, and achieved lower outcomes, as compared to representatives with low levels of collectivism. This suggests that the low-accountability situation may function as a release from what is expected for all representatives. This pattern is consistent with Yamagishi's (1988) notion that cooperative responses among collectivists are sustained by mutual monitoring and sanctioning, yet

⁵ We thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting the use of this design in future research.

in situations where monitoring is not possible, cooperative responses are not sustained. Similar to the responses of collectivists in the low accountability condition in this study, Yamagishi (1988) found that Japanese respondents (collectivists) engaged in competitive responses in a social dilemma situation when other people were not monitoring their responses.

Interestingly, this pattern is theoretically consistent with Lewin's (1951) notion of tension systems. According to Lewin, individuals and cultures exist in a constant state of tension, wherein there are both driving forces and restraining forces. As applied to individualism–collectivism, people generally sample from both interdependent and independent aspects of the self (Trafimow, Triandis, & Goto, 1991), but may enact a particular self depending on particular "channel factors" present in the situation. As applied to the present research, in situations wherein the channel is closed—that is, standards are defined and behavior is monitored (accountable situations)—individualists and collectivists may behave in accordance with the socially prescribed self: the independent self (competitive), and the interdependent self (cooperative) respectively. However, in situations wherein behavior is not monitored (unaccountable situations), and channels are open, individualists and collectivists do not have to behave according to the socially prescribed self, and may behave according to the alternative self instead (cf. McCusker, 1994).

Limitations

All research methods are flawed (McGrath, Martin, & Kulka, 1982), and laboratory and judgment methods are no exception. In the current research, goals of precision and testing cause–effect relationships were prioritized, and the methods chosen reflect these priorities. However, these methodologies maximize these priorities at the expense of generalizability, especially given that the study was conducted with students who were engaged in hypothetical negotiations. As such, it is necessary to exercise caution in applying these results to real-world contexts. Nonetheless, we are hopeful that these results will generalize to real-world contexts for a variety of reasons. First, there is increasing evidence that expert and novice negotiators behave similarly in studies which use the tasks used in this research (De Dreu, Giebels, & Van de Vliert, 1998; Neale & Bazerman, 1991). Moreover, theory which is well-grounded and supported in the laboratory is likely to translate to real-world contexts (Locke, 1986). Finally, the focus of our study, accountability, was operationalized in ways which captures important aspects of the phenomenon in real world contexts (i.e., evaluation, justification, and rewards), and participants in our study had incentives (i.e., money) which are also present in real-world situations. Nevertheless, this line of research, and negotiation research in general, will

greatly benefit from using other methodologies (i.e., interviews) as well as other populations.

Theoretical and Practical Implications

Since the dominant paradigm and research on negotiation have been developed primarily in the United States, they are likely to be laden with individualistic elements. With respect to accountability, researchers have warned that explicit pressures such as accountability lead to competitive negotiation behavior of representatives and lower outcomes in intergroup negotiations. The results of this study suggest that accountability does not necessarily produce competitive behavior, but rather produces the behavior which is most normative for individuals in their sociocultural experience. Future theorizing would benefit from explicating and examining the assumptions which guide research on negotiation. For instance, Gelfand and Christakopoulou (1999) found that competitive cognitive biases which characterize negotiators in the U.S., such as fixed pie error, are less prevalent for people who emphasize collectivism. It is also likely that there are cognitive tendencies among collectivists which have yet to be identified.

In addition, practical advice stemming from our theories should be closely scrutinized for its application to people of varying backgrounds. On the basis of results from accountability studies in the U.S., researchers have recommended that representatives try to escape the pressures of surveillance and evaluation (Organ, 1971; Wall & Blum, 1991). This study illustrates that this is sage advice for individualists. It is clear, however, that collectivists may benefit from being accountable, so this advice would be not only inaccurate for them, but also counterproductive. It may also be useful for mediators to take note of the type of representation that individualists and collectivists are subject to, and use this information to plan their own strategies.

Lastly, the results have implications for future efforts to build theories about culture and negotiation. The current research suggests that it is important to consider both *psychological attributes* cultivated in particular contexts (e.g., collectivism) along with *characteristics of the immediate situation* in which negotiators are embedded. This approach is consistent with Triandis' (1972) analysis of subjective culture, which highlights the importance of the interaction of elements of subjective culture and elements of the situation, in predicting behavior. At present, most research on culture and negotiation focuses on comparing different cultural groups on various negotiation behaviors (i.e., main effects). For instance, a growing body of research has focused on characterizing differences in the way that Americans negotiate compared with Chinese (Adler, Brahm, & Graham, 1992), Japanese (e.g., Graham, 1983), Brazilian (Graham, 1984), Russian (Graham, Evenko, & Rajan, 1993), Canadian (Adler & Graham, 1987), and French in-

dividuals (Campbell, Graham, Jolibert, & Meissner, 1988). However, the current research suggests that negotiators' behavior depends both on the nature of the negotiation situation, as well as on negotiators' collectivism. Applying this to cross-cultural investigations, this suggests that broad generalizations about the negotiation styles of cultural groups, which does not take situations into account, are likely to be inappropriate.

Conclusion

This research expands the dominant paradigm by incorporating the theory of individualism–collectivism into research on intergroup negotiations derived from Adam's (1976) boundary role theory. While accountability did affect representatives' psychological states, behaviors, and outcomes, it activated different construals and behaviors, and resulted in different outcomes, depending on negotiators' collectivism. By understanding how cultural elements enter into negotiation processes, we will be better able to develop comprehensive negotiation theories, and will be in a better position to apply our findings of this important method of conflict resolution.

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Appendix A

Negotiation Issue Charts

Discount	Colors	Billing	Circulation
The gallery issue chart (Buyers)			
20% off = \$2400	4 colors = \$2000	5 weeks = \$1200	500,000 = \$4000
15% off = \$1800	3 colors = \$1500	4 weeks = \$900	400,000 = \$3000
10% off = \$1200	2 colors = \$1000	3 weeks = \$600	300,000 = \$2000
5% off = \$600	1 color = \$500	2 weeks = \$300	200,000 = \$1000
0% off = \$0	No color = \$0	1 week = \$0	100,000 = \$0
NDC printing issue chart (Sellers)			
20% off = \$0	4 colors = \$0	5 weeks = \$0	500,000 = \$0
15% off = \$600	3 colors = \$500	4 weeks = \$1000	400,000 = \$300
10% off = \$1200	2 colors = \$1000	3 weeks = \$2000	300,000 = \$600
5% off = \$1800	1 color = \$1500	2 weeks = \$3000	200,000 = \$900
0% off = \$2400	No color = \$2000	1 week = \$4000	100,000 = \$1200

(Appendix B follows)

Appendix B

Collectivism Items (Triandis, 1994b)

1. It is important for me to maintain harmony within my group.
2. I would sacrifice an activity that I enjoy very much if my family did not approve of it.
3. Children should be taught to place duty before pleasure.
4. My happiness depends very much on the happiness of those around me.
5. The well-being of my group is a very important concern for me.
6. I really like to cooperate with others.
7. I usually sacrifice my self-interest for the benefit of my group.
8. Before making a decision, I like to consult with many others.
9. Children should feel honored if their parents receive a distinguished award.
10. If any of my relatives were in financial difficulty, I would help them even if it made my life difficult.
11. If a member of my group gets a prize, I would feel proud.
12. Sharing little things with my group makes me very happy.

13. I feel we should keep our aging parents with us at home.
14. To me, pleasure is spending time with others.
15. I hate to disagree with others in my group.
16. I would do what would please my family, even if I detested the activity.

Participants were told "We want to know if you agree or disagree with the following statements. The statements sometimes refer to your 'group,' which refers to your group of friends or any other group that you are involved in. Read each one carefully. Indicate your agreement or disagreement with the statement by using the following scale (which ranged from 1 to 9, strongly disagree to strongly agree)."

Received December 9, 1997

Revision received November 11, 1998

Accepted November 23, 1998 ■